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\ABSTRACT
According to recent public opinion polls, the threat of
•
Japan's growing economic power has replaced the fear of a
militarized Soviet Union. This is not at all surprising,
considering the manner in which Japan and its people have been
presented by the American media. Do the Japanese truly
threaten our national security? An analysis of international
economic figures suggests that Japan's economip presence,
albeit extensive, does not warrant the 'singling out' of Japan
that often occurs in the media; rather, the negative treatment
can be explained more adequately as propaganda. After
providing a structural framework of propaganda theory, this
study attempts to apply these theories to contemporary "Japan-
bashing." What becomes evident is that there is much more to
the analysis than mere economics. Also shaping the treatment
are a history of latent racism toward the Japanese, and the
postwar myth of American superiority . 'These combine to
prevent an objective evaluation of the Japanese. Though
evidence clearly indicates that the US is not the economic
power it was in the 1950s, it is difficult to discard the
notion of America as "number one;" instead, the Japanese
provide a handy scapegoat for explaining the. US' relat-ive
decline in the global economy.
1
Introduction
The Hate continued exactly as before, except that
the target had been changed.
-George Orwell, 1984
In early 1991, a generation that for the first tim~
witnessed the united states at war, was presented with yet
another reminder of war as the year came to a close -- the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. No American .television
viewer or newspaper reader could avoid the frantic barrage of
specials, documentaries, war films, headlines, even a postage
stamp, that commemorated the attack, reminding us of the
innocence of Americans, who upon sUffering unprovoked
violence, were drawn relu~tantly into the second World War.
Peace-loving, serene, consumption-oriented Americans in 1941,
as in 1991, just wanted to dance by the light of the silvery
moon, to drive their Chevrolets across the USA---not to 'get
;.-.)
into a war. But alas, we were attacked.... Isolationists
.... _. )
/.
(
could no longer resist· the inevitability of US military
involvement in the Pacific region. As in the Gulf War, during
which .. pUblic .. support.forUSinvolvemerit skyrocketed after the
war began, the real threat of war, of dead American boys,
encouraged strong support for military retaliation.
2
The commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the events
that took place at Pearl Harbor, or perhaps more accurately,
the staged recollection of Japan's historic act of treachery,
is particularly noteworthy during the current period of US
economic history since some observers have labeled it an
"economic Pearl Harbor". Senator Donald Riegle of Michigan,
whose constituency base is in large part formed.by
'f"
.. -,-- ...
autoworkers, used the term to describe Japan's assault upon
the US auto industryl. The term has also been applied more
generically by author Karel van Wolferen in his commemorative
editorial in the New York Times, "An Economic Pearl Harbor?":
The world that witnessed the Japanese attack on the
US is very different from the world today, but some
traits have remained the same, and bp1;h countries
'ignore them at their,peril. The cr~al
similarities are that Japan is out of control and
that the US cannot cope with Japanese power or
fathom Japanese intentions. 2
The treachery and the inscrutability of the Japanese; the I
naivete and inculpability of the Americans: the language and
the images are not unlike those of World War ,II. Van Wolferen
goes on to describe contemporary Japan as an "unstoppable and
politically rudderless entity," with "unprecedented power",
exerting itself "for what makes [the Japanese] feel most
secure: unlimited economic expansion to render Japan
invulnerable to capricious foreign forces." In 1941, this
lcited in John Dower , War without Mercy: Race and Power in the
Pacific' War (New York, 1986) 314.
.
2Karel.van Wolferen, "An Economic Pearl Harbor?" New York
Times 2 Dec. 1991: A17.
3
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lIentityll would have been the totalitarian military leadership;
today it is the monolithic network of economic organizations
that drive 'Japan, Inc.'.
,../ '
These types of conclusions with respect to Japan have not
been drawn merely to embellish timely reminiscences of the
IIGood War. 113 Again, to use van W~lferen as an example (as the
mainstream media often do), his thesis first attracted
attention in his 1987 article in Foreign Affairs, liThe Japan
,
Problemll , and was followed by ~he immensely popular The Enigma
of Japanese Power in 1989. Van Wolferen' s analysis was one of
several attempts by writers such as TRW's Pat Choate, former
Commerce Department official Clyde Prestowitz, professor
George Friedman, and Atlantic journalist James Fallows, to
name just a few, to help explain Japan's IImiraculous ll
ascendancy in the postwar global economy4. More recently,
<.,
several of these writers have served as lIexpe~tsll for media
analyses o~ these issues, as journalists scramble to relate
the legacies of WWII to the realities of today.
Probably the most disconcerting of these realities is the
trade deficit with Japan. Although the US has experienced an
3The term derives from studs Terkel, The Good War' (New York,
1984) •
4Karel van Wolferen, The Enicnna of Jaoanese Power: People and
Politics in a stateless Nation (New York, 1989); Pat Choate, Agents
of Influence:~ -How Japan's Lobbyists in the united states
Manipulate America's Political and Economic system (New York,
1990); Clyde V. Prestowitz, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to
Take the Lead (New York, 1989); George Friedman and Meredith
LeBard, The coming War With Japan (New York, 1991); and James
Fallows,' More Like Us: Making America Great Again (Boston, 1989).
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overall global trade deficit each year since 1976, the deficit
with Japan has hovered above $40 billion since the mid-1980s,
accounting for about 'half of the overall deficit. Also
fueling the general sense of anxiety about Japan are the
recent high-profile acquisitions by Japanese corporations of
such bastions of American culture as Columbia Pictures,
Rockefeller Center, the Pebble Beach golf courses, MCA (and
"Hawaii," ,some might add). The headlines project doom:
"Where Japan will strike Next", "Japan Invades Hollywood",
"The Japs Capture Rockefeller Center,,5. The image'ry of a
-
unified, strategic Japanese assault on the American economic
front is both prevalent and potent, suggesting that our very
heritage is being wrested away from us.
This is not a topic that gets lost in the business
section of newspapers, privy only to international financiers
or trade analysts. John E. Rielly reports in Foreign Affairs
the results of a 1990 Gallup poll conducted by the Chicago
council on Foreign Relations. in which 71% of the surveyed
pUblic felt that Japan practices unfair trade, while only 40%
attributed the same transgression to the European cornmunity6.
5Fortune 25 sept. 1989: cover (features Sony's Akio Morita
"aiming his filmless camera and other new goodies at the US and
world market~"); Newsweek 2 Oct. 1989: cover; William F. Buckley,
Jr. "The Japs Capture Rockefeller Center" (column), National Review
8 December 1989: 53 •.
6John E. Rielly, ''Public Opinion: The Pulse of the 90' s, "
Foreign Affairs Spring 1991, 79-96. The "public" in this poll was
some 1100 men and women; no information about region, occupation,
education, etc. was given to indicate biases of sample.
5
The overall thrust of the data was.that in the demise"of the
soviet Union's military threat to the US, the. "public" now
found much higher priority in addressing what were sensed to
be economic vulnerabilities vis a vis Japan's growth in
economic strength since the 1970s.7 Pollster William Watts of
Potomac Associates has similarly noted, in a study conducted
for the Commission on US-Japan Relations for the 21st. century,
that an increasing majority of Americans fear a military
threat from the Soviet Union less than an economic threat from
o
countries such as Japan8.
These poll findings are not surprising in light of the
media's consistent, extensive portrait of Japan as an
aggressive nation, oblivious to international rules of free
..
trade. These images have existed throughout the 1980's,
becoming more prevalent during the final years of the Cold
War, culminating in a climactic barrage of coverage as 1991
came to a'close. In those final weeks, half a century after
the "date that will live in infamy, "accounts of Japan's
7Europe's economic comeback after WWII' s devastation is rarely,
~f ever, patronizingly coined 'miraculous'; and, except in
reference tq rock music, its expansion into the US has not been
labeled an 'invasion' despite the fact ,that British, and until
1988, Dutch, investment in the US surpasses that of the Japanese.
Moreover, it must also be recognized that the European community
does not practice free trade, at least not outside the confines of
the community itself; members favor each other in order to enhance
community economic well-being. Even during Great Britain's exalted
period of 'free trade' during the 18th and early 19th centuries,
trade between Britain 'and commonwealth members was 'freer' than
between'Britain and nonmembers.
8Ron D. Elving, "How Americans View Japan" Congressional
Quarterly 31 March 1990: 968.
6
"invasion into us universities,,9, its importation of
keiretsu 10 styles of leadership to Japanese corporatI6nsin----------
the US, and its ensuing victory in the economic "war" with the
USll , served to support and prolong Pearl Harbor memories of
untrustworthiness, lack of restraint, and unprovoked
f
treachery; thus, public opinion toward Japan, if based upon
the images created in the mainstream media, has had virtually
~
no alternative to outright animosity vis a vis the Japanese.
Assessing the Threat
Should Americans be worried? Do Japanese economic forces
threaten our national security? If the situation is as dire
as commentators suggest, and as pUblic opinion reflects, then
I
we as citizens in a democracy should become knowledgeable of
developments in the US-Japan economic relationship and demand
9"selling Our Brains", 20/20. ABC. 6 December 1991. This was
broadcast the night before the actual 50th anniversary of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, one of ,several variations on the theme of
Japan as aggres~or.
1020/20. ABC. 27 September 1991. Keiretsu companies enjoy a
tightly interwoven network of suppliers, producers, and banking
facilities; Western critics charge that Japanese corporations set
up shop in the US but continue to favor their Japanese keiretsu
. members, thus eliminating American competition (or as The Economist
put it, "Japanese firms prefer to conspire rather than compete with
each' other ... , and now they are doing it in our own backyard"
("Inside the Charmed Circle" 5 Jan. 1991: 54». Moreover, as this
particular television segment maintained, Japanese executives
prefer to work with fellow Japanese, resulting in efforts to
"Japanize" plants.- Three cases were discussed in which white
American male managers were suing corporations such as Toyota,
Ricoh, and Fujitsu for discrimination b~sed on national origin.
ll"Losing the War with J~pan", Frontline. PBS. 19 November
1991.
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that our leaders safeguard our societal interests against this
"
threat. However, an examination of international trade and
investment figures offers a more tempered assessment of, the
situation. The figures reveal that Japan's economic growth,
from its wartime devastation, through its period of protected
reindustrialization, to its present status as the world's
greatest creditor nation with a GNP second only to the US' ,
has indeed been remarkable; but they also reveal that ~here
are other, actors, not just Japan, that are eXhibiting changes
in growth and power. For instance, it was only in 1988 that
total direct investment12 by Japanese corporations in the US
surpassed that of Dutch . cO:t:"porations, while British
'-~-, --.'
corporations have invested almost twice the amount. that
Japanese corporations have. And although the percentage of
Japan's gross domestic product gained from exports is roughly
one-third to one-half that of other industriai nations 13,
Japan is singled out for its use of "adversarial" trade
practices. 14 other trends suggest that Japan has closely
responded to American demands to narrow its trade surplus, to
raise its defense bUdget, to liberalize government
12The united States considers "direct investment" to be any
foreign holding that controls 10% or more of the voting securities
or 10% of controlling interest in a business, financial
institution, real estate, or an industrial facility.
13According to figures from the' International Monetary Fund and
The Economic Report of the President, 1992.
14This. is to. be contrasted with "competitive" trade in which a
country maintains balanced trade with other nati9ns.
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expenditures, and to remove numerous structural and cultural
barriers that make Japan resistant to high~value imports and
foreign investment, but these facts have not altered the
general line that Japan, singularly, has-the power, and the -------
will, to threaten our well-being.
Why don't the Japanese get better American press? Why do
we just hear about Sony buying Columbia Pictures (and the
onerous implications for American movie-viewers) , or
Mitsubishi buying Rockefeller Center (and thus, America's
/
Christmas tree), and not about, for instance, how the US, the
world's greatest debtor nation, has become so dependent on
foreign capital -- any foreign capital --- to finance the
budget deficit? Japanese capital has poured into weakened
real estate' markets, neglected smokestack industries,
government securities -- even Walt Disney World; subsequently,
US interest rates were kept low, jobs were provided (at higher
wages than those in domestically owned firms) , and
productivity has increased where Japanese capital has
J
rejuvenated some of America's industrial wastelands. In a May
31, 1988 New York Times OpEd piece, former New York Federal
Reserve Board President Anthony Solomon explained:
without direct investment, interest rates would have
to rise significantly to attract foreign money to
offset our large trade deficit. Aninterest-rate
rise would retard growth and domestic investment,
which would end up costing us jobs.
--
All of these factors, according to the" global capitalist
ethos, are good: good for Japan and gOOd for the US. For
.~---",
. 9
ours is an increasingly globalizetl, computer-linked
international economy that allows billions of dollars to be
transferred across borders and across oceans, at the touch of
a broker's fingertips; capital simply finds its' most
profitable niche. In the 1980s, the same factors of
::.."
deregulation and corporate concentration that spurred domestic
merger and acquisition activity within the US also encouraged
foreigners to acquire us assets at record levels; from 1984 to
1988 total foreign direct investment (FDI) increased four-
fold. And though US interests still hold about one-third of
worldwide FDI, the US became, in the 1980s, the largest
recipient of FDI activity. as outward {investment by Great
Britain 'began to exceed that of the US; in 1988, for instance,
38% of all international mergers and acquisition activity was
undertaken .by British corporations. ls But by the end of the
decade Japan became the world's greatest source of FDI, yet
another example of how the US has lost its edge to Japan.
Coping with Declining Hegemony
Clearly, America's de~lining ecopomic power in so many
areas comes as painful news to all those who have grown up in
"the American century"" particularly. those· in heretofore
peerless manufacturing sectors that now fear foreign
competit~on. What makes this new set of events even more
IS"The Changing Pattern of Foreign Direct Investment" World
Economic Monitor v. 4, Fall 1989, p. 2.
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difficult to accept, however, is that Japan, a nation
described in ,Newsweek less than 50 years ago as a "nation of
seventy million problem children", has become the most
visible, and perhaps most viable, contender for America's
forfeited position. Sam Rosenblatt, a lobbyist for foreign
investment and director of the Association of Foreign
Investors in America, has speculated:
When you've been heavyweight champion of the world
and all of a sudden you're not, it takes a little
time getting used to it.~
"Getting used to it" is one thing; ceding the
championship to Japan is yet another, if we are to judge by
~
the historical treatment of Japanese in America. "Japan-
bashing" is not only a contemporary phenomenon in the history
of US-Japanese relations; rather, the Japanese have
consistently encountered r'acism and condescension from the
-
American public and its leaders. Commodore Perry's
. 2.
expeditions in the 1850s to secure access to Japanese ports
were largely intended to tap the "great temptation" of
mercantile enterprise, the vast wealth and population of the
Chinese. In his instructions, however, was the strong message
that the Japanese were a weak, semi-barbarous people, "the
most common enemy of mankind", who were to be subjected to
manifestations of power if normal negotiations could not be
16"Cont..roversy Over Foreign Investment" Japan Report June 1988,
11
reached. 17 The US has exhibited a blend of cultural
chauvinism and distrust toward the Japanese that has colored.
relations ever since, culminating perlraps-most-aramatically iii
the post-Pearl Harbor relocation and internment of nearly all
of the Japanese Americans in· the uS;--regar?less of
citizenship. other incidents of racism toward the Japanese,
albeit more subtle and isolated, illustrate that the fear of
a "yellow peril" does exist and has manifested itself for over
a century.
This tradition of racism toward the Japanese, and more
recent frustrations about America's economic decline relative
to Japan's economic ascend~ncy determine and shape the
information that appears in the media. If all that we need to
know is that our country is losing its role as the undisputed
world hegemon simply because the inferior, problematic
Japanese have joined together to undermine our economic
strength, thus threatening the American Way of Life, then this
paper need go no further. But if we the people are not
thregtened to the extent suggested by the media, and polls
suggest that the majority of us do indeed feel threatened,
then we must explore the dynamics behind the image-making.
What else is going on that influences the media's treatment,
and thus public op~nion? Whose interests, if not those of the
17Instructibns from Acting Secretary>of State C.M. Conrad to
Secretary of the Navy John P. Kennedy, 5 Nove~ber 1852, reprinted
in David F. Long, ed., A Documentary History of US Foreign
Relations. Volume One. From 1760 to the Mid~1890s (Lanham, MD:
1980 )96.
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,general pUblic, are'furthered by fear and suspicions about the
Japanese? What type of information might we receive about
Japan if the news presented was neitl1_~r_~l1_~ped by, nor limited
to, these attitudes?
Questions such as these can be addressed and interpreted
through theories of propaganda. American citizens, nurtured-
under the guise of 'democracy', might bristle at the
suggestion, but today's war _revivalism and scapegoating,
bolstered by patriotic post-Desert storm reaffirmations of
American ideals and strengths, act as propaganda when they
tsuppress alternative explanations for America's declining
,
economic role in ,the world or for Japan's ascendancy.
In general, propaganda shapes pUblic opinion to accord
with the agenda of government or of other powerful interests.
outgroup hostility and fear can be useful to mobilize pUblic
sentiment in a certain direction. For example, President
Bush's demonization, or Hitler-ization, of Saddam Hussein
during the prelude to Desert storm left little room for
potential dissenters to justify their own obj ections to
militarization. In the early 1980s the menace of an "evil
empire" similarly weakened prospects for alternatives to
unprecedented ' defense' spending. Theorist Jacques Ellul.
observed in his 1965 ~P~r~o~p~a~g~a~n~d~a~: T==h~e~F~o~r~m~a~t~i~o~n~~o=f~M~e~n~'~s
Attitudes:
In the wo~l~ of politics and economics ..• the.news
is only about trouble,dq.nger, and problems. This
gives 'man the notion that he lives in a terrible and
frightening era, that he lives amid catastrophe in
13
a world where everything threatens his safety.18
In A People's History of the united states, Howard Zinn takes
this:i.cl~furthe:rL suggesti:llg that fear is used to the
----------
advantage of powerful ~nterests:
In this uncertain situation of the seventies, going
into the eighties, it is very important for the
Establishment -- that uneasy club of business
executives, generals, and politicos -- to maintain
the, historic pretension of rational unity, in which
the government .repres_~nt~C3.JJ,_t1lE:LpeolliL_an_c:l their
common enemy is overseas, not at home, where
disasters of economics or war are unfortunate
errors or tragic accidents, to be corrected ~y the
members of the same club that brought th~ disasters.
It is important also to~ake sure this artificial
unity of highly privileged and slightly privileged
is the only unity--that the 99% remain split in
countless ways, and turn against one another to vent
their angers. 19
By classifying Japan's growing economic presence in the
us in terms of war rhetoric, be it through allusions to WWII
atrocities (Japanese, not American) or to Japan as the post-
Cold War threat, the media message serves to unify American
citizens against the common enemy Japan, inspiring the
spirited patriotism and single-mindedness one would expect to
find in a conventional 'hot' war. Like Zinn, however,
Professors Edward 'Po Morgan and Robert E. Rosenwein suggest in
their paper "Competitiveness as Propaganda" that this contest
18Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes
(New York, 1965) 145.
19H d Z· API' H' t f th U"T t d st t (N.'; .owar l.nn, eop e Sl.S ory 0 e nl. e a es ew
Yor,k, 1980) 572.
14
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I
of "us v. them" unifies what is not necessarily a unity,. 20 As
once-dominant American interests, political, economic, or
otherwise, f ind themselves struggling~in--a-mu-l-'tieen-'Cri-c~~~~
global economy the message that "what's good for business is
good for America" is a popular one. Chrysl~r CEO Lee
Iacocca's charges that the Japanese are "beating our brains
in,,21; headlines tell us that we need to be more competitive;
. .
Presidents Reagan and Bush promised to telieve the tax and
regulatory burdens in order to foster our economic strength --
it's all in the national interest. Morgan and Rosenwein imply
that the common tendency to universalize the beneficence of
industrial profitability, which places . a-II of us on the
protectionist's or corporatist's bandwagon, obscures the
actual divisions
in society.
racial, political, economic -- that exist
Industrial profitability does not mean that we all
benefit in some way. If industrial profitability is increased
by relaxing environmental standards (as the 'Environmental
P~esident' vows to do), decreasing~the tax burdens of the·
corporate sector, dismantling regulatory bodies that monitor
worker safety and the soundness of financial institutions, or
20Edward P. Morgan and Robert E. Rosenwein, "Competitiveness as
Propaganda," Departments of Government' and Social Relations, Lehigh
University. Paper. 1991: 14.
21Lee Iacocca, Talking Straight (New York, 1988), 168 (italics
added). This is Iacocca' s follQwup to his 1984 bestselling autobi-
ography which sold 6 million copies worldwide in its first 3 years
9f print. .,
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by limiting ~he power of labor ove~ production and management
decisions, then clearly, corporate values and needs are being
disproportionately met at the expense of the needs of
'everybody else'.
Full awareness of this fact by 'everybody else' is
thwarted by the use of propaganda. The distraction provided
by a common enemy such as ' Japan, "Inc.' serves to minimize the
awareness of domestic inequities, and is crucial at a time
when the United states is faced with economic decline, when
American workers fear losing their jobs to the ' foreign
competition. ,22 If these workers are not provided with an
unambiguous image of a responsible "other" at whom they can
I
vent their frustrations, they might begin to unify among
themselves to explore inner failings within the
'establishment' that promises so much. They might begin to
see that their labor, their livelihood, often constitute"s
little more than a negotiable cost on a shrinking bottom line.
They might demand change.
* * *
22"Foreign competition" most often refers to the production by
non-Americans in other countries, usually under conditions of lower
cost, which workers see as undermining working conditions in the
united states. Not mentioned in the mainstream press are the
American corporations who have moved production abroad to secure
these same lower costs, often under less governmental regulation;
a sense of obligation to American society and its workers does not
seem to deter them from becoming part of the "foreign competition."
16
The purpose of this research paper is to produce a more
'complete' picture in which to explore the media's treatment
of"Japan, one that supercedes the discussion availa~e to us
through mainstream media outlets. By implying that there is
'something more' to which we do not have ready access, I. am
implying that propaganda exists to prevent such information
from surfacing.
~ ~
'The media treatment is shaped by claims of politicians,
industry leaders, and scholars ; it is consistently admonishing
or critical. Though there' are many ways to look at the
(
issues, the debate offers little possibility for understanding
Japan as anything but a nation of rigid, homogeneous
technocrats, wholly united in a zealous quest for world
dominance, and for understanding the economic decline of the
united states as anything but 'unnatural', or imposed from
outside.
For example, Japan is singled out by the media as the
nation that most threatens our economic livelihood, but
statistics suggest that there are other nations against which
the us has exhibited relative economic decline; the European
Community, various newly industrializing countries, and Japan
,
all participate at some level in the production process,
-
chipping away at the dominance of us producers. And many have
been able to do so because of the extension of us
multinationals abroad, through which technology and capital
have been transferred to nations offering cheaper labor and
17
fewer gov~~nmental restrictions. This simple observation,
,
.which suggests an alternative explanation for the US' current
situation, seems quite simple, yet it does not enter
mainstream analysis as a possible explanation for relative
decline. The propaganda does not go far beyond 'the. general
argument that an external "threat" is responsible for the US'
decline; thus, systemic problems, with global capitalism or
,
within the US, do not get explo!ed.
What follows is a theoretical treatment of propaganda,
.,
within which to understand how, and why, propaganda is used to
deflect analysis from potential systemic prob~ems to external
threats. These theories are then applied to the media's
, portrayal of Japan throughout the past several years. What is
the propaganda message? How does it get communicated? What
information, if any, is being left out in order to crystallize
the desired image? After exploring these questions it is
necessary to then determine whose, or what, interests are
served by the perpetuation of the message.
,
Finally, and
impol1tantly, what does propaganda imply for the "guise of
democracy" under which we live?
·1
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1. Propaganda Theory: A structural Framework
If a nation has narrowly contrQlled information,
it will soon have narrowly controlled politics.
-~Ben Bagdikian, The Media
Monopoly
The mass media serves as a system for communicating
messages and symbols to the general populace. It
·is their function to amuse, entertain, inform, and
to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs,
and codes of behavior that will integrate them into
the institutional structures of the larger society.
In a world of concentrated wealth and major
conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role
requires systematic propaganda.
--Edward s. Herman and NoamChomsky,
Manufacturing Consent
In order to suggest that there may be propaganda at work,.
it is necessary to explore the meaning of propaganda. Jacques
Ellul provides the following definition:
Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an orga-
nized group that wants to bring about the-active or
passive participation in its actions of a mass of
individuals, psychologically unified through psycho-
logical manipulation and incorporated in an organi-
zation. 1
,
Ellul is _. not simply describing methods of the soviet
Union's communist Party or of the Third Reich's Joseph
Goebbels, "organized groups" that have, in presumably un-
American fashion; disdained democratic forms of leadership-in
favor of totalitarian dictatorships. certainly his analysis
I
does encompass the propaganda of these groups, but he is also
describing the propaganda that exists in Western capitalist
. 19'
democracies like the united states, where those in power, or
seeking power, achieve and maintain their positions of
dominance through anti-democratic methods.
If a democracy is understood to be, a~ Webster puts it,
"a government in which the supreme power is vested' in the
\ .
people" and in which a fully informed citizenry exercises its
critical capacity to either govern itself or to ensure that
its elected officials do what it· wants them to do, then
certainly propaganda, as defined by Ellul, sacrifices this
literal sense of democratic involvement to ensure that the
citizenry cooperates, actively or passively, with private
interests. Democracy implies equality, collective decision
making, and a sense of community empowerment, but America's
~
"organized groups," or to use C. Wright Mills' 1956
expression, "the,Power Elite," often seek noninterference by
the pUblic so that their own private goals can be reached.
Dedicated to the continuous, unrestricted extension of
American political and economic influence abroad, and to a
domestic arrangement that allows for highly concentrated
wealth and power2, these groups would be threatened if the
citizenry demanded a more equitable system. How these groups
prevent the citizenry from seeking, let alone achieving,
2This past spring researchers at the Federal Reserv~ and the
Internal Revenue Service reported that the richest 1% of Americans
have increased their share of private wealth (between 1983' and
1989) by the largest margin since the 1920's. This group possesses
more wealth (stocks, bonds, real estate, capital, etc.) than that
of the bottom 90%.
20
,.
equity in the form of a more democratic system is at the core
of propaganda theory.
Ellul uses the term !'methods," imparting a sense of logic
v
to the use of propaganda. Indeed, logic and science have
contributed significantly to techniques of manipulation;
organization theory, psychology, data generation and analysis
-- all provide the skills with which to study and manipulate
public reactions in a certain direction, or to use Edward
Bernays' 1952 term, to "engineer" consent.
"methods" work today?
How do these
Several propaganda theorists maintain that the
propagandist's tool in Western society is the media, an
increasingly concentrated, profit-oriented industry that
touches virtually all Americans via printed or broadcast words
and images. 3 They suggest th~t narrow corporate ownership of
media outlets serves to limit the breadth and depth of
information received by the public. "Filters,,4 serve to shape'
3see , for example, Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly 3rd
edition (Boston, 1990); W. Lance Bennet, News: The 'Politics of
Illusion (NY, 1983); Edward S. Herman and Nbam Chomsky,
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media
(NY, 1988); and Martin Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources:
A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media (NY, 1991).
4Herman and chomsky suggest five: 1} the profit orientation of
mass media corporations; 2} advertising as a primary income source
of the mass media (in essence, this has two implications: the media
thus consider their viewers as 'customers' who must be attracted to
the television screen or headlines, not as fellow citizens who have
a right to objective information; also_, pUblications that advert-
isers do not deem worthy of their support,tha~'is, they are not
"attractive to those with' effective detnand", will not be able to
compete'--inthe~,media"marketr3) the reliance on officialdom for
information and- analysis (journalists become 'stenographers' for
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the news that reaches the populace by fostering a ,pro-
business, pro-government outlook, allowing government and
dominant private interests to get their messages across in a
favorable light, but in the process., thwarting the development
of a~d access to media that promulgate 'other' values; media
outlets that place emphasis upon human rights, labor, cultural
diversity, environmentalism, and other topics of a progressive
nature are marginalized to college campuses or are attributed
to 'left-wing fanatics' or 'radicals'. Walter Karp writes in
Harper's Maga~ine:
Very few newspaper stories are the result of
reporters digging in files; poring over documents;
or interviewing [nonpartial] experts, dissenters, or
ordinary people. The overwhelming majority of
stories are based on official sources on
information provided by members of Congress,
pr~sidential aides, and politicians. s
Government and corporate "experts," predominantly White, male,
and wealthy, rarely depart from traditional elite consensus;
the tone and interpretation of events are predictably
conservative6 and patriotic. Herman and Chomsky suggest that
the powerful); 4) "flak" to discipline the media if they outstep
accepted official wisdom (the charge that 'the media lost the
Vietnam War' is an example of flak that had serious implications
for the media's freedom during the Gulf War); and 5) anticommunism
(and I might add its corollary, the liberal capitalist system) as
a national 'religion' (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, 2).
sWalter Karp, "All the Congres$men's Men", Harper's Magazine
July 1989 reprinted in DataCenter, The Persian Gulf: The Media and
our Right to Know (Oakland, CA: 1991') 25.
6This is in spite of charges by conservatives that the media
are liberal _and anti-business; this - past spring, for example,
Congressman Don Ritter charged PBS with being asoundpiece. for
liberals, but see footnote 8 below 'for a rebuttal. Herman and
Chomsky include such charges' in the category of "flak", a filter
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this bias toward the powerful, and the I'\larginalization of
'everybody else', also determine the choice of topics to be
covered. 7 News that perpetuates the image of a benign,
democratic united states will be popular and prevale~t; so too
will' news that justifies an official 'enemy' stance. On the
other hand, news that may contradict these images can be, and
has been known to be, silenced8; 'safe' information that
supports the system, that encourages society's further
immersion into its ideology, spapes our understanding of the
world around us. 9
which serves to rein in the press.
7Herman and Chomsky, 1988,', '170.
8The oft-noted example is the PBS documentary Hungry for
Profit, which critically examined multinational activity in less
developed nations; its airing was preempted when corporate funding
by Gulf + Western was withdra~n. General Electric, an enormous
multinational with ties to the nuclear weapon industry and the US'
second largest defense contractor, now owns NBC; critics would
expect the same 'editorial skills' to be exercised on ·future
material that may explore the social costs of nuclear power, the
defense industry, or multinational activity.
9Bagdikian points out that 23 corporations control most of the
nation's newspapers, magazines, television, books and movies,
resulting in a "closed loop"; i. e., the content that appears in the
media is scarcely affected by alternative sources of news, because
many media outlets are interowned by the same monopolistic entities
(see excerpt from Media Monopoly in DataCenter, page 4). Another
source of corporate 'editorial' influence which cannot be ignored
is advertising, one of Herman and chomsky's "filters". Gloria
steinem's article in Ms., "Sex, Lies, and Advertising," illustrates
quite potently the influence that adv~rtisers have in shaping media
conte~t. Though she is mainly discussing the plight of women's
magaz ines, traditionally plagued by beauty industry-funded inanity,
her point· can be extrapolated to other media outlets: advertisers,
who largely pay for-what we read, w~tch, or listen to, want to sell
their products; they must have an audience who can be seduced into
buyfng their products. By dangling billions of dollars in front of
editors, they can ensure an editorial environment in which their
23
This can be done in many ways. One way is by selecting
"experts" as described above; not on:ly can the$e effectively
sell the desired system, but they can also discredit the
'enemy'. Herman and Chomsky write, "By giving these purveyors
of the preferred view a great deal of exposure, the media
confer status and make them the obvious candidates for opinion,
and analysis."
Consider, for example, the "experts" of the Gulf War from
whom the public gleaned its information: military strategists
who never strayed from the assumpt1.on that the US had to
retaliate militarily; dissidents such as the young~uwaiti
woman who shocked the West with accounts of infanticide (it
was later revealed that the allegations were false and that
she was the daughter of a Kuwaiti off icial who strongly sought
US retaliation), thus justifying the demonization of Saddam
Hussein; Bush Administration officials who rallied to their
leaders' cause.
The news gushed with pride, tears and a sense of American
purpose. Dissent was immediately marginalized, its
spokespersons labeled radical, un-American, and detrimental to
morale. In this war, dissent did not interfere with the_
Administration's plans; it was limited to college campuses and
products will be eVlan more attractive; e. g . , . pharmaceutical
companies that will not advertise in c,opythat- deals with drug
abuse; cigarette companies (who provide an enormous amount of money
to printed media because of the prohibition on televised
advertising) pUlling ads from an issue dealihg' with lung cancer,
~--- etc.
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the alternative press. Amidst the rest of the coverage, there
was no challenge to the status quo. The debate did not extend
beyond the assumption that the US had the right to force
S.addam Hussein out of Kuwait.
The certainty of the assumption was solidified by the
horribleness of the Iraqi leadership. Who could argue with
his record of human rights abuses and with the environ~ental
havoc wreaked by Saddam's oil well fires? Thus, even
'liberal' supporters of Amnesty International and 'liberal'
environmentalists were brought into the supportive fold,
weakening the possibility for alternatives to war. The
events, ,truly horrible, were somehow cheapened in their usage
as political tools. They cemented the image of Iraq that was
desired by those making decisions. Analyses of social and
historic forces up until August 2, 1990 were sacrificed for
personalized, one-sided, dramatic coverage that glued viewers
to their television screens. Chevron posted record earnings;
Raytheon's stock went up; President Bush's approval rating
soared; Americans kicked the dread 'vietnam syndrome'.
Indeed, the war wa~ won on the homefront before it even ended
in the desert.
These allusions to the Gulf War ~ are helpful in their
exemplification of propagandistic methods. Limited ,debate,
emotiQnal coverage that tugs at our hearts rather than our
intellect, the creation of an enemy to justify our own
righteous-ness: all exist in the media's coverage of Japan,
25
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just as they appeared in coverage of the soviet union when it
was an "evil empire."
Direct and Indirect Propaganda
-Ellul goes further to delineate two types of propaganda:
"direct" (or "agitation") propaganda, which seeks to bring
about the active participation of people, such as the
mobilization for war or tor protectionism; and ~sociological"
(or " indirect" ) propaganda, which seeks to instill a
continuous ideology, or climate, for understanding the world.
The two often work together; Ellul tells us, "Ideology is
disseminated for the purpose of making various political acts
acceptable to the people; ,,10 and, "Only propaganda can put man
into a state of nervous endurance that will permit him to face
the tens-ion of war. ,,11 Underlying ideologies and myths, or
latent s.entiments such as fear, provide a foundation upon
which direct propagandistic efforts can act at a later date.
It is this ~oundation, and its perpetuation, which is perhaps
the most reliable element of effective propaganda -- "a key to
understanding the whys and the reasons for economic and
political developments." 12
Longterm corporate influence over media content can
contribute to this effect; consumerism, global
lOEIIUI, 1965, 63.
11Ibid, 143.
12Ibid, 147.
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interventionism, militarism, and of course, capitalism, have
infiltrated our entire culture, defining for us the 'American
way of life'. We've been socialized to view alternatives as
,
distinctively 'unAmerican', Le., 'bad', and our own system as
·r,
superior. Indeed the myth of American supremacy has been
ubiquitous ever since World War II catapulted the united
states into the position of economic, military and political
leader of the 'free' world. since the 1950's its absolute
supremacy temporarily supsided: the soviets launched sputnik
and tested various brands of nuclear' weaponry; devastated
Allies have been restored, phoenix-like, to economic power and
political autonomy. The undisputed "American century" lasted
scarcely a decade, yet the myth remains strong.
In 1945 Life magazine's Henry Lucesaid that the
"American experience is the key to the future .... America must
be the elder brother of nations in the brotherhood of man. ,,13
Nearly half a century later, President Bush touts the same
message of America as exemplar, "the hope of the world. ,,14
Particularly as all watched the dissolution of the soviet
Union, American ideals of free markets and democracy truly
appeared to triumph.
Yet these ideals, however hallowed they are, have not
been able to feed or employ the former-·Soviets. And they are
13Cited in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(New York, 1987) 360.
14Quoted from President George Bush's state of the Union
address, 28 January 1992.
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certainly failing those in the United states who are becoming
increasingly disfranchised, politically and economically.
voting (or perhaps more accurately, nonvoting) statistics
reveal the apathy felt by citizens toward a system within
which they feel little political efficacy. The trite
expression "the rich get richer as the poor get, poorer" is a
too often overlooked, and understated, fact of American life.
Illiteracy, violence, racism, poverty, economic decline: all
soil "our beloved country," regardless of rhetoric that seems
oblivious to America's weaknesses.
Some interesting observations have been made on this
point. Edward Said suggests that "the United states,
triumphalist internationally, seems in a febrile way anxious
to prove that it is [still] Number One, perhaps to offset the
recession; the endemic problems posed by the cities, poverty,
health, education, production; and the Euro-Japanese
challenge. "IS In doing so, these problems do not get aired in
a manner conducive to their 'solution; they play second billing
to quasi-fascist reassurances of America's enduring greatness.
t
To quote again from the President's address: "There's been
talk of decline. Someone even said our workers are lazy and
uninspired. And I thought, 'Really? Go tell Neil Armstrong
standing on the moon. Tell the men and women, who put him
there. Tell the American farmer who feeds his, country and the
15Edward Said, "On Linkage, Language, and Identity", in Micah
,L'. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader (New York,
1991) 4'42.
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- world. 'Tell the men and women of Desert storm.' ,,16
. certainly what we are seeing can be interpreted as
election-year rhetoric, and like most rhetoric, it offers
little to -the listener in the form of a solution or -an
explanation. Ernest Mandel writes:
The causes of the relative decline of US hegemony
remain a mystery to most American specialists and
pOliticians because they refuse to judge history
from the viewpoint which sees the origins, rise and
fall of states and societies as ultimately
determined by objective laws. They prefer to
explain away the conundrum with plots--
, communist agents' who gave away the secrets of
nuclear weapons and power in China to 'the Reds'--or
they speak of the loss of the pioneer spirit which
must now be reawakened by some new ' frontier. ,17
The myth of America as "number one" leaves little room
for the discussion of America's decline. In the textbook
version of American history, ours has been one of pride,
perseverence, and power: isolated from potential foes by
oceans on each side of us, dominant over the indigenous in our
own hemisphere, founded by willful pioneers with taut
bootstraps, "the leader of the West that has become the leader
of the world." Internal failings? That's just not America.
16" Someone," as everyone in that chamber was aware of, was a
Japanese politician who caused a furor in this country when he
suggested that 30% of American workers were illiterate (he was
close), and did not work as hard as Japanese workers; in other
words, he suggested that America has domestic problems that have
detracted from its competitiveness in the global marketplace. The
President displayed both domestic and, international political
prowess by appealing to the pUblic anger, yet cautiously avoiding
specific reference to. the J"apanese in order not to disrupt the US-
Japan "friendship." .
17ErnestMandel~' Europe v. America: Contradictions· of
Imperialism (New York, 1970) 5.
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We are again confronted with the. idea of the responsible
'other' as an explanation for decline, -eomething or someone
that does not play 'the American way': communists, "welfare
queens", Japs.
It is here that we return to our topic of analysis: how
the media utilize the Japanese economic threat "to explain
away the conundrum" of America's declining hegemony. Both
Mandel and Said imply that attention is turned away from
domestic causes of decline, either by ignorance or by
scapegoating. In the case of ignorance, we have an
Administration that keeps telling us, "Everything is fine;
free markets and consumption will bring us out of this
temporary slump; look at what they've done for us already!"
Paul Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers quotes
Cordell Hull, the "Good War" Secretary of State: "All these
principles and policies are so beneficial and appealing to the
sense of justice, of right and of the well-being of free
peoples everywhere, that in the course of a few years the
entire international machinery should be working
satisfactorily. ,,18 Kennedy observes: "Whoever was as
purblind as not to appreciate that fact ...would be persuaded
by a mixture of sticks an.d carrots in the right direction."
In the case of scapegoating, we have a media and
countless politicians who attribute this 'unnatural' decline
to the Japanese.·
18Kennedy, 1987, 361.
Nation Tokyo correspondent Karl Taro
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Greenfeld writes about "an idea that has been lurking for some
years in America's collective pop-culture unconscious: The
Japanese are evil. The Japanese have been accused of bearing
the ··responsTfiility for any· or all of the following:
unemploYment, budget deficits, the declining industrial base,
trade imbalances, low savings rates, unfair trading, high real
. ~
estate prices and, now, low real estate prices. ,,19
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, these issues are often
treated in mi~itant terms, interspersed with WWII imagery of
unprovoked assault. But what is gained, and by whom, if
citizens feel that their nation is in the midst of a war? If ~
attention i~ always airn,ed at what Japan is doing? If internal
fai'lings become non.issues? Japan-"bashing" is not just about
economics. It is also about fear, racism, scapegoating -- and
politics. It becomes political when public opinion, shaped by
propaganda rather than by a diverse exchange of opinions and
. .
information about the US-Japan relationship, demands political
action, or inaction, to deal with the "Japan problem".
The propagandist can vary, as can the desired effect.
When political action is desired, the propagandist is often
the captain of an "invaded" industry who seeks pUblic support
for protectionism; or he is a corporate leader who seeks tax
incentives with which to become more competitive; or he is a
President seeking reelection who flies off on a trade mission
19Karl Taro Greenfeld,"Return of the Yellow Peril", The'Natibn
11 May 1992: 636.
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to "lay down the law" to Japanese leaders.
Those who seek political inaction depend on a compliant
pUblic who do not question their activities. The myth of
"laissez-faire" economics, for example, sanctions the
noninterference by pUblic actors into private economic realms,
thus allowing many US firms to escape domestic resistance to
their goals. The reverberating message that we must compete
against the Japanese economic threat achieves this same docile
effect. In times of emergency, the President has the right to
act swiftly according to his ~dgment, undeterred by the slow
workings of the system; by implying that we face an economic
threat from Japan, our leaders inspire the same acceptance of
authority.
To return to the topic of democracy, a fundamental
requirement is that citizens have access to full information,
with which they can determine their own values and priorities,
in turn influencing their leaders to act according to these
concerns. This requirement is not being fulfilled if the
information is not complete; if perhaps there are other
reasons for America's decline that do not enter the debate; if
perhaps the problem is not with Japan per se, but with the
global capitalist system.
, .
If the imagery encompasses only
those aspects of Japan that justify the inten1;ions of the
propagandist, whether that is to seek election or government
protection of industry, to attract consumers with guilt-
inducing xenophobia, to justify continueq military spending,
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or to perpetuate the myths of American supremacy in an era of
national decline, then it is democracy that loses in this game
of "us v. them".
!
What lends complexity to the analysis is that Japan-
"bashing" as we've known it in the eighties and nineties has
not existed in an historical vacuum. Indeed, the imagery has
become more ubiquitous as financial acquisitions by Japanese
corporations become more visible and culturally sYmbolic.
Television makes this issue particularly dramatic. However,
the images of Japan's untrustworthiness, cultural differences,
lack of restraint, and threats to the American worker are not
recent; they have largely defined the. impact of the Japanese
.'
economic presence for well over a century. The next chapter
presents this reservoir of images of and treatment toward the
Japanese, and serves as a foundation for understanding how the
cultural chauvinism and racism of the past shape, and justify,
contemporary propaganda. We can then grasp the meaning of
Ellul's statement, "The propagandist limits himself to what is
already present. ,,20 It is to this relationship, between
longterm socializing propaganda that has instilled sentiments
about ourselves and about the Japanese, and the more direct,
contemporary propaganda that demands that we "get tough with
Tokyo", that Ellul refers.
WEll~l, i965, 199.
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2. From Perry to Pearl: America's Ties to Japan
Formal relations between the united states and Japan,
political and economic, were established in the late 1850's
when commercial treaties were sig~ed by both natiorls. Prior
to this time British merchants attempted to engage in trade
but were turned away. The us was the first western sea power
to m~ke serious attempts to break more than two centuries of
Japanese isolation from the West. The reason? Japan lay as
an obstacle to China, with which the west had been trading for
years in what was declared an "Open Door Policy". Zinn wryly
observes that these policies assured "that the united states
would have opportunities equal to other imperial powers in
exploiting China. "I
According to Commodore Matthew Perry's instructions for
the mission, the us saw in Japan, which "lay in the route of
the great commerce 'with China," a tool to further trade, an
ideal port for the refueling of steamships-and for a us naval
presence in the Pacific, and the guarantee of safety for
American whalers who might become shipwrecked and sUbj ected to
Japanese imprisonment2. In Perry's instructions the Japanese
.
are described as a "weak and semibarbarous people," the "most
common enemy of mankind," who needed to be compelled, either
militarily or diplomatically, to respect the citizens and
vessels of "civilized Rtiit.e.J;n by entering into treaties to
- ,-
IZinn, 1980, 399.
-'2Frances V. Moulder, Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy
(Cambridge', 1977) 130.
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open their ports. 3
Japan, in essence, was jUdged to be inferior to the West
in matters of negotiation, vital only in its performance as an
enhancement of Western trade. Today, many Japanese resent the
history of the "black ships" that brought Perry to their
shores',demanding trade rights and imposing unfair treaties4.
Racism and insolence on the part of the united states existed
from the very beginning, despite a certain amount of initial
friendliness and curiosity. Japanese imperial leaders were
eager to pursue Western-style development; academic and
industrial experts were hired from abroad, while students of
elite families were sent to study at American institutions.
And there was a good deal of Western interest in Japanese
culture and traditions, which were highly developed despite
Japan's isolation from Western "enlightenment." But however
quaint its culture, the Japanese were seen as pupils of the
united states, whose desire to emulate 'and "catch up" to the
west pleased the US, but was never taken, quite seriously.
Japanese historians agree that Japan was never considered to
be a potential equal in international political or economic
issues that involved Western nationss• The physical and
3Long 1980, 96; see Chart 20 in appendix for a copy of these
instructions.
4Susumu Awanohara, "Scapegoats No More," Far Eastern
Economic Review 22 November 1990, 36.
SJohn smith, Department of History, Lehigh ~piversity.
Lecture. 27 FeBruary 1991 ..
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cultural distance from Europe and the US made it difficult for
Westerners to infiltrate Japanese markets. Marginalized and
thwarted by the unwillingness of the West to share technology
with Japan as they did among other Western nations., Japan
ultimately achieved industrialization through exports of silk
to the US. Desperate for the US dollar with which to purchase
American oil and steel, both nonexistent on the Japanese
mainland, a typical primary commodity situation arose. The
peasantry was squeezed for increased production under forced
labor conditions, as the military dictatorship focused on
building a strong, formidable armed forces. When Japan
defeated China in 1895 and Russia in 1905, to the .astonishment
of Western powers, the concern was that Japan w6s acquiring
too much domination in Southeast Asia. Zinn observes:
So long as Japan remained a well-behaved member of
that Imperial Club of Great Powers who--in keeping
with the Open Door Policy--were sharing the
exploitation of China, the united States did not
object. 6
But Japan did not behave as a lesser power was exp~cted
to in this period of history highlighted by Western
colonization and suppression of national sovereignty. The US
itself had seized Hawaii and Guam, SUbjugated the Philippines,
and had declared tradi~g opportuni~ies in China and Japan.
Closer to home the Monroe Doctrine justified the seizure of
Puerto Rico and economic exploits in Central·-America and
Mexico . European powers possessed economic spheres in Africa,
6Zinn, 1980, 401.
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Central America, India, Indochina and China. But Japanese
efforts to do the same, to secure a sphere of influence within
which to access raw materials for continued industrialization,
" .- .
were resisted by the US fOr clearly economic purposes: Japan
was, and remains, wholly dependent on outside sources for oil
and iron ore, and until the end of the 1930s, the US was
Japan's greatest trading partner for these materials.
Japanese domination in Southeast Asia would not only disprace
British, Dutch and French colonial holdings, but would provide
Japan with alternate sources for primary commodities. Noam
Chomsky observes in The New Cold War:
An egalitarian modernizing revolutionary movement in
one area might serve as a model elsewhere. The
long-term effects, it was feared, might go so far as
an accomodation between Japan, the major industrial
power of the East, and countries that had extricated
themselves from the US dominated global system. The
end effect would be as if the US had lost the
Pacific War, which had been fought, in part, to
prevent Japan from creating a "new order" from which
the US would be effectively excluded. 7
The image of an aggressive and expansive Japanese
military dictatorship gained popular awareness in the US only
after its defeat of China and Russia8. However, the image of
a "yellow peril" wi thin the US was already permeating the
Pacific States, where nearly all of the Japanese emigrants to
the US had settled in the 1890's.
Japanese immigration in lar9~ numbers to the US mainland
7Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York, 1982) 136.
8carey McWilliams, Prejudice: Japanese Americans: Symbol of
Racial Intolerance (Boston, 1944) 23.
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did not begin until almost the end of the 19th century. Those
who first arrived in the early 1890s were typically young,
male, rural laborers from Hawaii and Japan, who came to settle
on the West Coast. 9 Possessing little capital and unable to
communicate in English, most of these workers upon immigrating
to the US entered into the lowest classes; however, it-is
worth noting that in their own country, these same
agricultural workers derived from a proud, ambitious, educated
'" middle class. 10 These qualities, along with the tendency
-among the Japanese American community to qooperate with each
other, led to considerable success in the US agricultural
sector. Chart twenty-two illustrates the growth in the
Japanese farms in California; particularly notable is the
period from 1900 to 1920, in which the acreage controlled by
Japanese farmers increased from 4698 to 361,276 acres.
Individually or pooled with other Japanese these farmers
became highly competitive with native farmers, causing
"'-.
tensions that persisted up until. World War II. As Austin
Anson of the Grower-Shippers Association of Salinas stated in
a 1942 Saturday Evening Post:
If all the Japs were removed tomorro~we'd never
miss them... because the white farmer can take over
and produce everything the Jap grows, and we don't
9See Chart twenty-one which illustrates the influx of Japanese
from 1891 through 1942.
l~arry H. Kitano, Japanese Americans:
subculture (Englewood Cliffs, 1969) 14.
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The Evolution of a
want them back after the war ends either. ll
certainly the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor lent
considerable bravado to anti-Japanese sentiment, but the
foundation for tensions had already been laid by anti-Chinese
sentiment that immediately preceded the arrival of Japanese
immigrants.
The Chinese had immigrated to California after the
di~covery of gold ip 1849; by 1852 the Governor of California
advised immigration restrictions, claiming that the Chinese
"lowered the standard of living [by accepting low wages and
living sparsely, ~nd] were unassimilable heathens who came
only to take American money." Competition for jobs was the
main economic motive for anti-Chinese violence and·
legislation. In an 1879 state election which achieved a
staggering 95% voter turnout rate, 154,638 citizens voted for
Chinese exclusion; 883 voted against. Chinese immigration was
thus suspended in 1882. 12
Japanese immigration encountered almost immediate
discrimination and hostility created in most part by existing
anti-Chinese organizations; 13 like the Chinese before them,
the Japanese were Asian, nonc~ristian, and of color in
short, unlike those emigrating from the opposite shore.
llQuoted in Chalmers--.j Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle
(Stanford, 1982) 32.
12Kitano 1969, 10.
13Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, East Across the Pacific
(Santa Barb~ra, 1972) xiii.
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In May of 1900 the first anti-Japanese mass meeting was
held in San Francisco, sponsored by the San Francisco Labor
council. Dr. Edward Alsworth Ross, professor of sociology at
stanford, iterated the group' s objections to the Japanese
immigrants:
1) The Japanese, like the Chinese, were unassimilable
into the American culture.
2) Their willingness to work for low wages undermined
labor standards in America.
3) Their standards of living were lower than American
workers.
4) They lacked appreciation for American democratic
institutions. 14
Also at the, meeting a resolution was passed urging the
extension of the Chines~ Exclusion Act to the Japanese. A
series of sensational, inflammatory articles in the San
Francisco Chronicle followed, containing provocative articles
with titles such as "Crime and Poverty Go Hand in Hand with
Asiatic Labor," "Japanese a Menace to American Women," or
"Brown Men are an Evil in the Public Schools." Within two
months after the resolution was passed, the Japanese and
Korean Exclusion League was formed in San Francisco. other
anti-Asian groups also gained pr9minence, such as the Native
\.... Sons of the Golden West, who professed that the state of
California should· remain "what it had always been and God
"himself intended it shall always be-",:,the White Man's
14McWilliams 1944, 16.
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Paradise... the 31st star shall never become dim or yellow. "IS
The 1913 California Alien Land Bill was passed to provide
,
that Japanese aliens could lease agricultural land for a
maximum of three years, and lands already owned or leased
could not be bequeathed. Co-sponsor of the bill, state
Attorney General Webb, stated quite matter-of-factly that "the
fundamental basis of all legislation... has been, and is, race
undesirability. It seeks to limit their presence by
curtailing their privileges which they may enjoy here, ,for
they will not come in large numbers and long abide with us if
they can not acquire land. And it seeks to limit the numbers
who will come by limiting the opportunities for their activity
here when they arrive. ,,16, Interestingly, at the time of the
bill's passage there were more than 14 million for~ign born
citizens residing within the US, mostly European, yet
opposition to the small Japanese minority of 72, 000 waS
intense.
After WWI came to an "end and workers and soldiers were
relieved from their military occupations, agitation caused by
economic and occupational competition was reignited, largely
through the efforts of Caucasian farmers. By 1924 'a national
law was passed that restricted the numbers of immigrants from
various' nations to fixed quotas; Japan was given no allotm~nt.
Chart twenty-one illustrates the sharp deq,l--me in Japanese
15Qtioted in McWilliams, 1944, 23·.
MKitano 1969, 16.
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immigration after 1924. In that year 11,526 aliens were
admitted from Japan; the following year, only 3222 immigrated
and more than twice that amount emigrated or were deported.
bespTtethe act, exclusionists s"till agitated and_ attacks
based on race, nationality and economic competition continued.
Japanese were stereotyped as imperialist, unassimilable, "un-
American," and mysterious; it was these perceptions which led
to the Japanese incarceration and detainment that followed the
attack on Pearl Harbor. ~
The wartime Images of the Japanese
For decades before the attack the "Japanese problem" had
been contained to the West Coast; few Caucasians elsewhere in
the US had had any experience with Japanese Americans. This
ignorance helped foster and maintain the negative stereotypes
that had heretofore been limited to California, but after
Pearl Harbor, were deluging the national media. Newspapers
controlled by William Randolph Hearst promoted "yellow
journalism" in which sensationalized headlines reverberated
the charge that "all Japs are traitors." In January of 1942,
Henry McLemore, a syndicated columnist for several Hearst
papers, wrote:
"lam for the immediate removal of every Japanese on
the West Coast to a point deep in the1nterior ..• let
'em be pinched, hurt, hungry. I>ersonally,. I hate
the Japanese. And that goes for all of them. 17
17Quoted in Johnson, 1982, 32.
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Immediately 'after the attack selected "enemy aliens,"
Japanese as well as Germans and Italians, were arrested by the
FBI. The evacuation of only Japanese Americans, however,
began on March 2, 1942. Of the 126,000 Japanese Americans in
the US at that time, 112,000, two-thirds of whom were American
citizens, were evacuated from the Western half of the three
Pacific states and from southern Arizona, and were interned
for over three years in relocation camps. These camps were
often comprom~sed of no more than cattle sheds, and it was
under these -conditions that the evacuees were detained --
under guard, without charges, hearings, or due process of law,
in spite of the fact that all US 6itizens are entitled to due
process under the US constitution. Those eligible for
relocation were defined as those having as little as 1/8
Japanese blood. Commanding General John Dewitt explained:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial
affinities are not severed by migration. The
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second
and third generation Japanese born on us soil,
possessed of us citizenship, have become
'Americanized', the racial strains are
undiluted .18
Germans and Italians, however, were not SUbjected to the same
criteria; they underwent selective apprehension and
imprisonment, not an indiscriminate evacuation and detention.
The pressure from California individuals and groups, the
sensational treatment by the press, the heritag-e" 'of anti-Asian
18Jacobus Tenbroek et aI, Prejudice. War and the Constitution
(Berkeley and Los Angeles; 1954) 3.
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prejudice, \and the ~gnorance -of most Americans of the
Japanese, resulted in what has now been judged as having been
morally wrong and unnecessary treatment of American citizens,
"falling into the ugly abyss of racism" (it has not been
officially jUdged, however, as unconstitutional) i apologies to
the evacuees and their families have been expressed by
Presidents Reagan and Bush, most recently during the latter's
speech at Pearl Harbor's USS Arizona Memorial this past
Decemb~r. Though the President refused to apologize for the
200, 000 Japanese that died in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki19 , or for the 97, 000 that died during the fire-
bombing of Tokyo2o, he reaffirmed the unjustness of the
relocation of the Japanese Americans to the nation's center,
away from the shoreline from which immigrants were wrongly
suspected of signalling Japanese naval forces21 .
19President Bush as quoted in a New York Times article: "No
apology is required, and it will not be asked of this President, I
can guarantee you ....War is hell, and it's'a terrible thing. But
there should be no apology requested" (2.Dec. 1991: A12). The
article's author, Times CIA expert Michael Wines, adds that "the
President made it apparent that he believed that the atomic
bombings were a justifiable response to Japan's conduct in.the war
and ... an important means by which Japan's surrender was hastened .•.
In saying that the bombings saved American lives by hastening the
war's end, Mr. Bush adhered to what has long been the unofficial
explanation for the world's only use of atomic weapons in wartime. "
20Figures refer to civilian deaths, using official figures and
current revised estimates i Dower, 1986, 298. .Zinn notes_ also that
12 US Navy fliers in the Hiroshima city jail were also killed,
though never officially acknowledged.
21"President Rejects Apology to Japan," The New York Times 2
December 1991: A12i Charles Shiro Inouye, "Dealing with the
Problem Race," The Nation 12. December 1988: 641.
44
As the "problem race" within the US was being summarily
dealt with,
propaganda.
all Japanese faced dehumanizing wartime
Dower observes, interestingly, that political
cartoonists would portray Hitler, for example, as himself;
whereas "the Japs" were often sYmbolized en masse as rodents,
vermin, or one of various simian images22 . When depicted as
human, they were indistinguishable, buck-toothed, grotesque;
there was no effort to single out individual bad Japanese
apart from the Japanese as a whole. The propaganda attacked
the very essence of the Japanese race, as i? evident in these
words written by journalist Ernie Pyle, a war correspondent
for 700 newspapers across the us:
In Europe we felt that our enemies, horrible and
deadly as they were, were still people. But out
here I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked
upon as something subhuman and repulsive, the way
some people feel about cockroaches or mice. 23
Upon seeing some Japanese prisoners in a fenced-in enclosure,
he observed further:
They were wrestling and laughing and talking just
like normal human beings, and yet they gave me the
creeps, and I wanted a mental bath after looking at
them.
From Army war films to magazine cpvers to newspapers such
as The New York Times and The Philadelphia Inquirer, the enemy
22Japanese propaganda against America and Great Britain used
recognizable,- albeit caricatured, images of the nations' respective
leaders, rather than a single loathsome and fearful image to
represent the entire caucasian race. As mentioned above, this
"courtesy" was extended by the US· to Germany, but not to Japan.
nQuoted in Dower, 1986, 78.
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was typified as an abstraction--evil, less than human, a
threat to all if not stopped--justifying, if not encouraging,
pUblic support for the destruction of Japanese cities that
followed. Indeed,. fifty years after Pearl Harbor, the
American media seem to recall only the 2403 "heroes of the
Ha...rbor", who lost their lives, albeit horribly, on that Sunday
morning. The disparate value of these American lives,
compared with the 300,000 civilians who died during the US'
retributory bombings, saturation and atomic, of Japan's
cities, was made shamefully clear by President Bush's, and the
media's, adamant pressure on Japan's leaders to issue a formal
apology for Pearl Harbor.
Sam Keen, author of Faces of the Enemy, tells us that the
war imagery nations create to illustrate enemies is vital in
justifying political actions that may follow. When the enemy
is "louseous Japanicas" ,24 or a vicious ape,2s and not an
actual human being with an individual life as precious as our
own, he is much easier to kill. Lieutenant Calley's self-
defense for his role in the Mi Lai massacre during the vietnam
War was, "Nobody told us they were human". More recently, the
\
British press quoted Marine Lieutenant-Colonel Dick White's
description of Iraqi citizens, fleeing from structures that
had been carpet-bombed, "It was like turning on the kitchen·
24As depiQted in the US Marine monthly Leatherneck, March 1945.
2sAs depicted in Washington Post, The New York Times,
. Collier's, Philadelphia Inquirer, and others.
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light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying
We finally got them out where te could find them and kill
i
them. ,,26 Dehumanizing the enemy in such a manner helps to
remove the moral horror of another human's death -- yet it
makes the deaths of our own that much more horrible.
Afte-r Japan's devastation at the hands of. the Allies, the
images of its brutality that had permeated the mainstream
media were not only unnecessary, they were no longer justified
by war~ The US policy turned from war to occupation and
reconstruction---and as the policy changed, so did the image
of the vanquished.
Just as the Japanese became "pupils" to Western
"teachers" after the Tokugawa era of isolation came 'to a close
in the 1850s, the post-war Japanese were to be taught the ways
of democracy and free trade. In the portrayals of occupied
Japan, the ape became a "curious simian", a mimic, a chimp;
-
the enemy, albeit "primitive" and "emotionally disturbed", was
tame, malleable and dependent upon the united states. More
, gracious' images depicted the Japanese as "infants in the
crib," or "seventy million problem children" attending General
(
26Cited in Ellen Ray and William H. Schaap, "Minefields of
Disinformation," Lies of these Times March 1991, reprinted in
DataCenter, 1991: 41. The British journalist, Robert Fisk,
queries, "What' is the new world order worth when an American
officer, after only three weeks of war, compares.his Arab enemies.
to insects?"
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MacArthur's school for democracyv.
similar ,notions, as Dower observes:
MacArthur himself held
[MacArthur's] guiding philosophy during the
Occupation, [as] stated in widely publicized Senate
hearings in 1951, ... had been to treat the Japanese
as 12-year-olds. 'The German people were a mature
race. If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in
his development, in the sciences, the arts,
divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as
mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their
antiquity measured by time, were in a very
tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of
modern civilization, they would be like a boy of 12
as compared with our development of 45 years' .28
MacArthur's "philosophy" was not without forerunners iTh"
western thought; rather, it perpetuated images of the "little
brown brother",: or "white man's burden" that justified
colonialism. Biological determinists such as the French
anatomist Etienne Serres went even further to justify racial
various races according to skull or brain measurements,
!
/
~_.
~-
inferiority of 'coloreds': while some scientists ranked
Serres' conclusion that "adult Mongolians" were equivalent to
white adolescents was based on the distance between the navel
and the penis; he found that the navel, "that ineffaceable
sign of embryonic life in man," attains greater heights in
whites than in Asians (rather conveniently, the navel attains
even lesser heights in blacks than in Asians, thus confirming,
empirically, the formers' in;feriority to those of loftier
VDower provides these and several other examples of
descript~ons taken from post-surrender publications such as
Collier's, Newsweek, and The New York Times; 302':'303.
28Ibid, 303.
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umbilici) .29
The Legacy continues: Japan-Bashing Throughout the century
within two to three decades after Japan's military defeat
the West witnessed her "economic miracle" unfold. However, to
say that the US has been purged of its previous racism toward
the Japanese would be false, because today's racism parallels
many of the issues that have arisen throughout the past
century. Public opinion and the media have embraced many of
the same sources of conflict that existed at the turn of the
century.
The fear of economic and occupational competition by both
the Chinese and the Japanese was expressed by the Governor of
i
California in 1852: _the Chinese came only to take American
money. Iacocca similarly charge in 1988, "Now they're [the
Japanese] using the money made off us by snapping up real
estate. You could wake up tomorrow and your landlord is no
longer Joe Smith, he's Joe Akimoto. ,,30
The economic competition of Japan and other Asian nations
continu-es to be interpreted as largely due to low wages.
Iacocca has stressed the fact that low Japanese wages
---
29Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasurement of Man (New York, 1981)
~Iacocca 1988, 200.
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exacerbated US unemployment and loss in competitiveness31 , and
Van Wolferen has stated that the Japanese have compromised
their own people's living standards in order to accumulate
-i
capital with which to infiltrate foreign markets. 32 This
closely parallels the claim of the San Francisco Labor council
that Japanese obj ectionability was based in part on the
willingness of the Japanese to work for low wages and for
lower standards of living, thus undermining American Labor
standards. 33
Charges of unassimilability into the American culture
were prevalent in terms of both the Chinese and Japanese, but
for many Japanese Americans, the humiliation of internment
spurred a s~adfast, process of 'Americanization' as many
sought to dispel racial insults. Today charges of
unassimilab-i,lity are usually leveled at the busine.ss
community. An article in The Economist recounted the
sentiments of "America's many grumblers about Japanese
investment":
Japanese firms do not blend into their surroundings.
They are run by Japanese, the real decisions are
31As mentioned earlier the auto industry is not blameless here;
setting up shop in these low-!,age countries has led to higher
profits than what the US labor market allows.
32Van Wolferen 1989, 3.
33Japan's 1991 budget allowed for a $3.4 trillion obligation to
public works,' a 73% increase over the amount spent during the
previous decade, (Economist, 5 January 1991, 28). American trade
negotiators argue, like Van Wolferen above, that Japan should spe~d
more on the infrastructure, leaving less to spend on export,
industrIes.
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taken at head office, foreigners have no chance of
promotion, and all the fancy design·.work is done at
home, leaving the overseas ~,actory as just an
assembly plant for imported components .. This is why
Japanese car factories are known rudely as
, transplants' : unnatural organs vulnerable to
rejection bytbei)::". ne\'l__l::>()9-Y.~~
critics of Japan's "unassimilable" management styles fear
that Japanes~ firms will simply import keiretsu, vertically
integrated conglomerates, which would further remove American
firms from the production process. 35 These conglomerates have
become the symbol of both Japanese "groupism" and of the
impenetrability of the West to Japanese markets.
Just as the California Alien Land Bill sought to limit
opportunities for Japanese agricultural success in the US,
efforts exist today to punish Japanese economic activities.
For instance, in 1989 a rural Nebraska district attorney
invoked an old statute barring foreign ownership of farmland
in an attempt to revoke the sale of a cattle ranch.to Japanese
investors. critics suspected that Japan would profit from
lowering its barriers to imported beef and rice by purchasing
US farmland, meatpacking plants, and grain-handling
facilities. However, less than 5% of the $1.2 billion of beef
and veal that was exported to Japan in 1990, for example, came
..
from Japanese-owned suppliers, according to the US Meat Export
~23 February 1991, 68.
35"Inside the Charmed Circle" The Economist January 1991, 54.
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Federation. 36
Moreover, the committee on Foreign Investment in the US
watches over Japanese investment, pork-barrel legislation has
been passed to protect local industries from takeovers, and
the continuing strategic Impediments Initiative talks demand
'-.../'
reforms in no less than 240 trade items.
Igareshi Takeshi, professor of political science at the
University of Tokyo, likens the us demands for trade reform to
the us Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the series of
postwar demands for comprehensive reforms issued by the us and
announced by Occupation authorities in September of 1945.
Both incidents arrogantly assumed that Japan should accede to
American demands and carry out reforms. 37 Other demands made
by the us upon Japan have been as patronizing. Journalist
Robert Christopher observes that America's "tutorial" attitude
toward the Japanese must be taken in combination with the
traditional inclination of Americans to conceive of their
society as a model for all others; thus "blind spots" in
American thinking about Japan have emerged, and the us
continues to treat Japan '~with a mixture of arrogance and
·disregard. ,,38 He cites the example of President carter, who
expressed the need for a mission to Tokyo to propose that, in
36Brenton R. Schlender, "Are the Japanese Buying Too Much?"
Fortune Fall 1990, 100. ~
37Igareshi Takeshi, "Circumventing Japan-US Conflict" Japan
Quarterly January-March 1991, 15.
38Robert C. Christoper, The Japanese Mind (New York, 1983) 25.
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r-
order to reduce its perennial trade surpluses, Japan ~hould
alter those structures of its economy which us firms find
impenetrable, such as its distribution system, the keiretsu,
and other features.
Probably the most blatant parallels of racism throughout
the century exist in the media's use of militant images to
describe Japanese economic a~vity. A 1984 Gallup poll that
.. ,
questioned whether Japan was a dependable ally showed that
those over 50 were less trusting of the Japanese;39 and a 1991
Time/CNN poll indicated that those over 50 tended to be the
"most guilt-ridden" about buying Japanese products. 4o For
those who lived through World War II, the parallel between
Japan the military threat and Japan the "economic juggernaut"
might seem more real than for the rest of the population, yet
war metaphors have become a recurrent phenomenon; 'the Japs are
attacking us, invading our culture. For example, when
Mitsubishi Estate Co. paid $846 million to gain 51% of the
Rockefeller Group, Fox Television broadyast old war movies
featuring Japanese' zero' fighters striking American soldiers.
Using another WWII event to express frustration, Texas
Congressman Jack Brooks stated in 1988, "God bless Harry
Truman. He dropped two of them. He should have dropped
39"Gallup Poll Finds Majority of Americans Considers Japan
'Reliable' Ally" Japan Report May-June 1984, 1.
40Advertising Age 3 February 1992, 44.
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four. ,,41
Allusions to the Japanese "empire" appear in Daniel
Burstein's 1988 book Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and
>
Its Threat for America. Burstein states that Japan is using
its massive capital surplus to "sow the seeds of empire,"
recalling pre-War Western concerns about Japan I s growing
influence in Southeast Asia~ Other recent works similarly
suggest Japan's return to 1940s' bellicosity: zaibatsu
America: How Japanese Firms are Colonizing Vital u.s.
Industries, Pearl Harbor Ghosts, Trade Wars, The Silent War,
and The Coming War with Japan are just a few titles that
suggest that we must consider ourselves to be'in a state of
war, or rapidly approaching it. Howard Baker, Jack Anderson,
Helen Bentley, Lee Iacocca, and Chalmers Johnso~ all have
claimed that Japan, having failed at military conquest, is
building their empire by more peaceful, more silent means than
in World War II.
Henry McLemore wrote about the Japanese, "let 'em be
,
pinched, hurt, hungry. Personally, I hate the .Japanese. "
Forty years later the rhetoric has changed little. Former
House Speaker Tip o'Neill, expressing that Japan trade has
been extremely unfair to the US, stated that if he were
President, he would "fix the Japanese like theY've'never been
4,1cited by Doug Henwood in "Playing the zaiteku ~ame," The
Nation, 3 October 1988,266.
54
fixed before."G Reagan Admini~tration economist Arthur
Laffer observed in a manner that recalls McArthur's cultural
chauvinism, "On a pUblic-policy level, Japan is far and away
the most dangerous nation. By analogy, they are the
equivalent of an immature teenager with a fully gassed
Corvette or a 13 -year-old with - a loaded shotgun... The
irrational behavior of well-to-do adolescents is legendary.
They start wars. "43 And only last year Senator Alphonse
D'Amato commented about Japan's lack of support for Operation
Desert Shield: "[The Japanese] are acting totally within the
character that they usually do. They are motivated by profit,
greed and avarice.... Theirs is an attitude that I think
really is ~epugnant."M
The images that Americans continue to receive about the
Japanese tie in closely with those of the past century;
whether they are characterized as "·inferior", "untrustworthy",
"brutal" or "inhuman", the Japanese seem to always be
characterized en masse. There is little opportunity for them
to be seen as a nation of individual human beings, responsible
for their own behaviors and opinions, rather than as
indistinguishable, homogenous manifestations of some
monolithic entity, of "Japan, Inc." Photographs in magazines
GChristopher 1983, 310.
43Quoted in David Hale, "You Pat My Back, I'll Pat Yours"
National Review 16 April 1990, 36.
MQuoted in The Asian American Quarterly Spring 1991, 5.
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like Newsweek often perpetuate these 'mass' images: crowd
shots illustrate shouting peasants dressed in traditional
garb, business-suited executives trudging their way down a
densely packed sidewalk,laborers bearIng picket-signs-,-0~--------~
white-shirted office workers seated in row after row of
desktops. The images are purposely unsettling, too
reminiscent of the "Jap hordes" of World War Two. They also
affirm how different the Japanese are from Americans, who are
socialized to value the individual as the driving force of a
truly successful society.
The images provide us with a def inition of who the
Japanese are, with no ambiguities. In doing so, they leave us
with little need to question official attitudes and pOlicies
toward Japan, whether that be to force open trading ports or
to drop an atomic bomb upon a civilian population center.
Policies of excessive force and potential amorality require
justification and cooperation for their smooth adoption; the
'myth' of. Japan and the Japanese have provided that
justification throughout the century.
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3. Mythic America: The Postwar International Order
The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-
to-son inheritance, but th~ persistence of a certain
world-view and a certain way of life, imposed by
the dead upon the living.A-ruling-group is a
ruling group so long as it can nominate its
successors. The party is not concerned with .
perpetuating its blood, but with perpetuating
itself.
--George Orwell, 1984
The flipside of the traditional assumption of Japanese
cultural inferiority is, of course, white, or We~tern,
superiority; and of the Western nations, it was the VS that
emerged as the unquestioned leader of the postwar
international order. After the "mutual enfeeblement of [its]
main competitors"l during the two World Wars, from which the
US' infrastructure escaped relatively unscathed, it seemed
quite natural for the US to be the "elder brother of nations,"
to help rebuild devastated nations, to ease the process of
decolonialization, and countless other projects for which the
r
US alone had the political and economic leverage. In the
textbook version of history, the US achieved all these things.
However, what. detracted from the nobility 'of the rhetoric
about official gestures was the purely ideological motivation
behind postwar policy. As Assistant Secretary of State for
the Near East George C. McGhee elaimed in 1947, "Our trade of
free enterprise has become so thoroughly ingrained in our
economic thinking that it amounts with us to al~ost a
religion ..•. We are perfectly sincere in our conviction that
lMandel ,1970, . 9.
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~ it would be in the best interest of other nations to follow
our example."
Therein lay the unifying postwar myth that superceded, at
least temporarily, the myth of the Japanese threat: America
as exemplar, as 'Number One.' The external threat became, of
course;, the soviets. Dower tells us, liThe war hates and race
!
hates of WWII ... proved very adaptable to the Cold War. Traits
which the Americads and English associated with the Japanese
with great empirical sobriety were suddenly perceived to be
really more relevant to the Communists (deviousness and
cunning, bestial and atrocious behavior, homogeneity and
monolithic control, fanaticism divorced from any legitimate
goals or realistic perceptions, megalomania bent on world
conquest) ."2 - The -role of the enemy was thus transferred to a
new menace, or to use Churchill's label, lithe real menace from
the East. II Both George F. Kennan and John Foster Dulles
justified the Russian threat by pointing out that the Russians
were, after all, an Asiatic people, an "explosive mixture of
traditional Russian insecurity, communist ideology,' and
Oriental s'ecretiveness and conspiracy. ,,3 Chinese communism,
which combined the Red and Yellow Perils provided perhaps the
worst scenario, and so the Chinese along with the soviets
displaced the wartime enemy; Jap~n, which had by this time
become quite congenial to us interests.
2Dower, 1986, 309.
3Ibid, 309. Kennan quoted in 309n.
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The Cold War had obliged ·the us to restore the economic
strength of Western Europe and Japan, if anything to foster
~upe~E!-fgr cap~talism, discouraging their attraction to
communism. In Europe this restoration took place in the form
of Marshall Plan assistance. Japan did not receive direct aid
due to the (not surprising) unpopularity of such measures on
the American home front4, but a significant boost to its
economy came with the "Korean War Boom" in the 1950s. 5 Just
as American productive capabilities were boosted by wartime
government spending, or "military Keynesianism", so were
Japan f s when they were employed for the production of war
materials ·by the US Department of Defense. 6 International
arrangements set up in the mid-1940's -- the International
Monetary Fund, the Intern~tional Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade --
4Kennedy, 1987, 380 .
. 5More direct measures were taken by Occupation.officials in
response to what were considered to be socialist tendencies. The
power of labor unions, legalized for the first time by the new
constitution, was decreased in response to the threat of a general
strike; the growth of the Liberal Democratic Party, congenial to
the US and to capitalism, was encouraged in order to distract from
the popularity of Japan Communist Party (which vehemently rejected
tne post-war military relationship between the US and Japan, and
favored labor unions and the nation&lization of industry); and the
_ original plan to completely disband the zaibatsu, bank-centered
family monopolies judged to be too closely tied to the previous
imperial system, was halted in order to retain capitalist power
over important industries.
6Japan received neariy $2.2 billion in U.'S. military pro-
curement orders from 1950 to 1953, accounting for nearly 65% of
Japanese exports during those years (Robert Pollin and Alexander
Cockburn, "The World, the Free Market and the Left," The Nation 25
february 1991, 230).
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were designed to further reconstruct cbuntries who subscribed
to the tenets of the US-led international econ0mic order:
free trade, convertible currencies, open competition, anti-
communism.
In theory and in rhetoric all would benefit from these
measures, but as Paul Kennedy points out (as did Lenin in his
theory of imperialism), the liberal capitalist system favors,
almost by definition, the strongest competitor, to the
detriment of those devastated by war or otherwise unable to
enter the trade game. The US was clearly the most
competitive; its supply of raw materials and superior
industrial capabilities ensured the comparative advantage
necessary to 'win'. Not accidentally, uninhibited trade and
investment translated to vast new markets for American excess
productivity and capital; "As you know," remarked a State
Department official in 1944, "we've got to plan an enormously
increased production in this country after the war, and the
American domestic market can't absorb all that production
indefinitely. There won't, be any question about our needing
greatly increased foreign markets."?
Nations left vulnerable by their need for foreign capital
allowed US firms to invest freely into their industries; by
the early 1970s over half of the world's largest industrial
corpora-tions were in the hand of US owners. 8 Between 1958
7Quoted in Zinn, 1980, 404.
8World Economic Monitor 1989,1.
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and 1963, in the European Economic community alone, over 3000
us firms either set up subsidiaries or gained control over
already existing firms. Many of these firms were in strategic
industries such as aircraft, computer production,
telecommunications, and petroleum. By 1965, for instance, 80%
of the EEC's computer production was in the hands of American
firms; 24% of its motor industry. Moreover, of the direct
investment by us firms in Great Britain, West Germany and
F~ance, 40% was owned by General Motors, Ford, and Standard
oil. And in Germany alone, nearly 50% of the foreign-owned
capital was in the hands of firms such as General Electric,
Proctor and Gamble, and Gillette. 9
In Japan as well, US firms were uniquely able to seCure
strong positions in its postwar economy. Japan's lack of raw
materials, capital, and tools justified direct investment by
firms such as Chrysler, Ford, and Texas Instruments. Closer
to home, Canada was becoming a "branch-plant economy" with
three-fifths of its manufacturing, and a large portion of its
national resources, in foreign hands; 80% of this foreign-
owned sector was held by Anierican firms.
Toronto's Abraham Rotstein recalls:
r _~_.---
universitr' of
-
At first the Canadian public was mollified with
reassurances about global horizons, the march of
progress, and looking outward. Arguments that made
distinctions between domestic companies and foreign-
owned sUbs,idiaries were generally dismissed as
...
~andel, 1970, 22n.
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, .....
alarmist or xenophobic. 10
The immediate benefits to these targeted firms were the
infusion of American technology, and the development or
rejuvenation of industrial capabilities. In turn, US firms
saw an increase in returns from foreign investment: from 10%
of profits in 1950 to 24% by 1964. 11 The arrangement sounds
benign enough; however, resistCl-nce abroad began to show itself-
as the political ramifications of such an arrangement gained
,
pUblic awareness. Rotstein continues:
But as further studies and experience uncovered some
of the shortcomings and artificial characteristics
of the economy's foreign-owned sector, pUblic
concern began to mount.
To many Canadians, and to many Europeans, their nations
were losing too much control ovel1 something so basic as their
means of production. Actual control over private enterprises
is always in the hands of a few powerful stockholders, but
still, it could be argued that domestically controlled firms
are more responsive to local conditions than are firms
controlled from abroad. Mandel notes that "capital controlled
from the other side" can be devalued; or confiscated, from one
day to the next depending on prospects for profitability.
"There is nothing to prevent giant corporations, with
ramifications -everywhere, from switching orders from one
country to Cl:nother if it suits them, blackmailing wage-earners
10Abraham Rotstein, "When the united States was Canada's
'Japan'" Harvard Business Review January-February 1989: 38.
11Mandel, 1970, 13.
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or trade unions whose wages are 'too high. ,,12
In response to these concerns, the Canadian government
established the Foreign Investment Review Agency (now
,
Investment Canada) in 1973, whose purpose was to ensure that
a proposed takeover would provide "significant benefit" to the
Canadian economy. In Europe, the "American Challenge," to use
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's term, encouraged European
economic integration within which free trade would flouris~
under a supranational parliament. In Japan at this time, a,
relatively inward-looking, managed economy achieved tremendous
growth without the level of American penetration that other
industrial nations experien?ed more directly; indirectly,
however, its uni-directional progress was fostered by the US'
Cold War "defense" of the region -- -thus, capital was
reinvested more quickly into research and production rather
than into military expansion. In addition, exporters relied
heavily on the US-sponsored free market -- much more than
those domestic producers who were threatened by imports -- but
that is certainly not unusual. Noam Chomsky notes in
.,
Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic societies
that the US deve.l0ped in its earlier· years through
protectionist measures; by the time liberalism was touted as
'the end all an~ be all, ' -,the assumption was that· the US would
be immune to any serious competition. The same goes for Great
12Mandel, 1970, 131. I can imagine that Mandel appreciates
Michael Moore's film Roger and Me.
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Britain: it was a proud advocate of free trade during its
period of hegemony, but when faced with American and Japanese
economic competition in the early decades of the twentieth
century, it abandoned its purist doctrines.
In essence, unencumbered free trade and competition have
not been, in practice, a natural state of affairs for
capitalist countries, even for the united states. For
example, military spending, spurred by anti-communism, has
provided those firms fortunate enough to have garnered
lucrative defense contracts with enormous capital investments.
~ .
SeYmour Melman, in The Permanent War Economy, points out that
it was World War II, rather than the New Deal, that pUlled
America out of the Great Depression; the whole economy boomed:
emploYment increased; industries expanded; civilian
15.
consumption increased 25% between 1939 and 1945 to the highest
level in US history. "Everyone saw the economy producing more
guns and more butter. Economically speaking, Americans never
had it so good. ,,13 Defense spending, as a means to general
prosperity, has remained popular, or at least justified, ever
since; even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, coverage
of the Gulf War dazzled its audiences with its emphasis on the
,
new "smart" weaponry that, jUdg~ng by the sanitized'treatment
by the Pentagon and the military-censored media, permitted a
quick, clean military defeat of Saddam Hussein.
13seYmour M~lman, The Permanent War Economy (New York, 1974)
6~
state-sponsored research and development14 , tax policies
that reduce corporate liabilities, deregulation, and
diplomatic muscle all serve to guarantee profits, to protect
iiidUs'trY,ahd to extend American capital abroad; yet the
illusion of laissez faire free trade is still touted as a
global panacea. In 1988 former International Trade Commission
chairperson Paula stern and Washington economic consultant
Paul A. Landon had this to say in affirmation of the postwar
system of free trade:
Current U.s. economic problems are not caused by the
structure of the open postwar system which it
created. They are a function of poor economic
coordination with other countries since the vietnam
War, the oil shocks of the 1970' s, and falling
productivity in much of West Europe and in the U.s.
due to flawed economic policies. solutions should
address these issues directly. IL they attack the
proper problems, the United states and its allies
can continue to exploit the reinforcing link
between trade and security which is in keeping with
the best traditions of U.s. democracy and which has
served Americans so well for 43 years .15
They go on to claim that "the united states [alone] had
the political will to force its allies to open their economies
after WWII because it thought the action would make them
stronger," and like President Bush in an earlier quote, they
maintain that "the united states remains the preeminent
military, economic, and even intellectual center of the
14Estimates suggest that 75 to 80% of R&D is military-
related. See Melman, 1974, 23; Herman E. Daly, For the Common
Good.
15paula Stern and Paul A. Landon, "A Reaffirmation of U.$.
Trade PO:J,Jicy" Washington Quarterly Autumn 1988: 57.
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world. 1116
Isolated policy blunders and inept implementati9n are to
blame for what may appear to be temporary economic 'setbacks.'
That there might be systemic problems with the liberal
capitalist system does not enter popular argument. Inviolable,
always, is the myth of free trade and of a superior, yet
benevolent, America at the helm.
16stern and Landon, 1988, 65.
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4. America and Japan Today: "the most serious schism of the
postwar era ,,1
We've been fighting against Karl Marx since the late
1940's. We got Karl Marx. He's dead. 'But some
guys tha.t weren't playing that game have blind-sided
both of us. You know, the Cold War is over and
Japan won.
--Professor Chalmers Johnson,
"Losing the War with Japan"
The previous two sections have dealt with latent
assumptions about Japan and about the united states. In this
section we return to propaganda theory, applying it to
contemporary Japan-"bashing". That is not. to say that we have
strayed far from the topic, for these myths -- Japan as
threat, America as 'Number One', capitalism as the One True
Path -- illustrate Ellul's idea of sociological, or pre-
propaganda. Prepropaganda, as discussed earlier, serves the
function of disseminating ideology, providing a climate within
which to understand the world. "Those who read the press of
their. group and listen to the radio of their group are
constantly reinforced. in their allegiance, that its actions
are justified; thus their beliefs are strengthened... proving
the excellence of one's own group and the evilness of the
others. ,,2
In the American media, these myths are taken for granted;
serious criticism of them either does not appear, or is
trivialized with an air of scepticism.
1Newsweek 9 July 1990, 45.
,.2Ellul,·1965, 213.
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Importantly, they
become so imbedded in the social fabric, that individual
events, and their explanations, get absorbed into the mythical
framework. In the case of mainstream treatment of Japan, the
foundation for explaining isolated events is that the Japanese
are ever the "laborious artificers," never to be completely
trusted, always "lesser men," and always different. The myth
of American supremacy ensures that all is well, and any
appearances to the contrary can be explained away by 'threats'
or by others' inability to play by the rules3 •
But there are contradictions within these myths which
require propaganda to resolve their inconsistencies. For
example, what is criticized as "non-Western" in the behavior
of Japanese economic actors has nevertheless toppled American
dominance in certain industries during the past two decades.
This nation of "pupils" finances a quarter of the US'
financial deficit; it is the largest donor of foreign aid; it
is the largest creditor nation. On an aggregate level,
Japanese workers are more productive (as a percentage of gross
domestic product), society is much less crime-ridden, and
literacy is virtually universal. In fact, the united Nations
has ranked Japan number one according to these and other
quality of life indicators; the us ranks 17th. In comparison
with other industrialized nations, not just Japan, the us has
some rather unappealing features for a 'world leader': its
3A recent PBS series on US-Japan trade was entitled American
Game r Japanese RUles,· according to an article in Far Eastern
Economic Review (5 Dec. 1991, 46).
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incidences of rape, robbery, drug offenses, and murder (per
100,000) is more than double that of the other nations ranked;
educational achievement scores are the lowest; per capita
.energy consumption is almost double that of the others (nearly
three times that of Japan). Moreover, it is perhaps old news
that the US' trade deficit dwarfs that of any nation, but it
is also the world's largest debtor nation, with inflows of
foreign investment that total 28% of the GNP, compared to
7.6%, .9%, 3.0%, and .2% for the UK, West Germany, France, and
Japan, respectively.4 Chart 23 in the appendix indicates also
that US investment (as a percentage of gross domestic product)
is the lowest among Western nations, and consumption as a
percentage of GDP is second to none but Greece.
Charts 24 and 25 illustrate the steady economic decline
of the US in the mid 1980's in the areas of national
production as a percentage of global GNP and its exports as a
percentage of the world total. Chart 12 illustrates relative
trade balances of the US to other OECD nations; chart 13
continues the US data into the end of the 1980's. Though the
total US deficit peaked in 1987 and has subsided in the years
since, the US in 1990 still held deficits with all areas
except for Western 'Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa and Eastern Europe. Combined, the individual surpluses
.
recorded after the first three quarters of 1990 total less
4These and other-statistics appear in the appendix of Annual
Editions: co~parative Politics (Guilford, CT, 1991) 238-239.
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than $10 billion; the total us trade deficit at this time was
$105.5 billion. In addition to these international economic
statistics, the banking and S&L crises came to a head in the
late 1980's, and the federal bUdget deficit continues to soar.
Japan on the other hand has demonstrated consistent
economic growth relative to the US decline, a fact which has
not gone unnoticed by the American public. A January 1990
NBC/Wall street Journal poll posed the question "When it comes
to economic power which country is currently in a stronger
position-the US or Japan? 73% of Americans polled responded
"Japan"; only 20 % thought that the us held a stronger
position. s In the same poll, 54% of the respondents said that
competition was a problem "because U. S. business and labor
have fallen behind in productivity and quality of products".
These are strong issues for Americans to face, considering the
myth of global economic hegemony that has existed throughout
the postwar years.
But as evidence has suggested in earlier sections, too
often the. problem of declining hegemony is dealt with by
blaming the Japanese presence' for the decline. Congresswoman
Marcy Kaptur of Ohio observed in 1990:
"Millions of us workers have lost their jobs, some as a
result unfair international competition and the snail's
pace at which legitimate trade grievances. are addressed.
The united"States is IOI;dng its economic integrity due to
huge federal budget deficits and an .unyielding trade
SElving 1990, 968.
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deficit with Japan.,,6
As an Ohian, Ms. Kaptur should be able to balance this type of
generalization wxth evi~ence of the benefits that states like
--
- --- ----.. -
Ohio have achieved from Japanese FDI. For instance Honda of
America is located in Marysville, Ohio, representing a $2
billion investment and employing 80~0 workers. 7 Ohio, in
fact, is the only state to host more than one assemQler, the
other being a Ford-Nissan joint venture. The state has also
benefited from FDI in the declining steel industry. After
major US steel corporations closed more than 100 U.S. plants
between 1960 and 1987, Japan's Kobe Steel established a
partnership with USX to make bar and tubular steel at a plant
in Lorain, Ohio. The $500 million investment included a $50
million plant-modernization program. 8 Contrary to the
observations of many of Japan's critics, however, this type of
investment can improve the US's economy by providing jobs and
productive capacity in an era when many US companies are
moving off-shore to ~ke advantage of lower costs for labor
and other resources.
One way to resolve the inconsistencies of an 'inferior
Japan' on one hand, and the relative decline of the US to this
6"Is Japan 'Buying' u.s. Politics?" Harvard Business Review.
November-December 1990, 184.
7Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, "How Japanese Industry is
Rebuilding the Rust Belt" Technology Review February-March 1991,
27.
8James V. Higgins, "Domestic Steelmakers Find a Way to Thrive"
Ward's Auto World September 1989, 63.
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same· Japan on the other, is to keep them from becoming
"official" news. When .we read or otherwise learn about
Japanese society, we' are confronted with a barrage of
information: the Japanese smoke more than we do; they work
longer hours; they treat women less fairly than we do; they
live worse than we do; they've damaged the environment more
than we ~ave; their government is not only less democratic
than ours, but also corrupt, and so on. The media reports ad
infinitem on issues that perpetuate the image of an inferior,
strange Japan, predictably unworthy of too much respect
in spite of their economic prowess. We end up with what Ellul
calls a "summary jUdgment." He explains:
This claim may seem shocking, but it is a fact that
excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the
listener; they drown him. He cannot remember them
all, or coordinate them, or understand them; if he
does not want to risk losing his mind, he will
merely draw a general picture from them. And the
more facts supplied, the more simplistic the.image. 9
Lance Bennett , in :.;:Nc.:e,-"w,-=s:..::,--_T=hc.:e,--P:::...o=l.=ic.::t:..:=i:.::c,-=s::..-c.:o:..:=f,--=I.=l.=l:.;::u:,::s:..::i:..:::o:=n ,
further~ that these tidbits of information, potentially
dismissable as trivia, are ~evertheless cemented together by
latent myths and images, mutually reinforci~g each other to
hinder a new awareness about Japan and its people; new' news'
simply fits old myths. lO
9Ellul, 1965, 87.
lOW. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion (New York,
j ~1983) 41.
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with a potential. agenda is quite apparent.
Anti-Japanese Propaganda in the 1980s
As alluded to throughout this paper, the context in which
Japan has been presented has been consistently negative.
During the early and mid-1980s the news centered on unfair
trade practices in particular industries, ~sually steel,
textiles and autos. Chrysler's Lee Iacocca often appeared on
television and in print to expound the "war" with Japan and
the need to protect ourselves from foreign competitors who do
not play by the same rules. In the 1988 sequel to his earlier
autobiography, Iacocca observes the need to cut back on
"social costs" such as EPA and OSHA regulations' and
"excessive" rights (to sue, etc.), telling us in his folksy
chatter that "we reallyphave to get off that kick that equates
any hazard with setting your mother on fire."ll
That this is propaganda issued by an "organized interest"
Rescued from
J
insolvency in 1979 by mUltibillion-dol~arloans guaranteed by
the federal government, Chrysler enjoyed great profits in the
early 1980s, but with\ these profits Chrysler bought race car,
airline and defense companies, emphasizing financial rather
than productive innovation; Chrysler again began to slide. In
response, his prptectionist messag~generalizesthe effect of
competition from Japanese auto manufacturers on his own
industry to the populace as a whole, as in this February 10,
1991 New York Times qp~ed piece:
llIacocca 1988, 263.
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"Those "who say that protectionists have their heads
in the sand have it exactly backward. The real
ostriches are those who believe that we can survive
economically by simply ignoring those who target our
market while protecting their own."
The message, and its delivery, obviously endeared Iacocca to
many; in fact, in 1984 he was urged to run for President of
the united states. But his agenda is personal, to protect his
own company. The audience gets so swept up by his rolled-up
shirt sleeves, and by his love of Mom and America, that they
forget he is the millionaire chief executive of a huge
multinational corporation that is responsible to its wealthy
stock holders, not to "us".
\. Advertisers have jumped on the bandwagon as well. A 1990
General Motors commercial showed a scene of Christmas 2001:
"Imagine, a few years from now. It's December and the whole
family is going to seethe big Christmas tree in Hirohito
center," and after a pregnant pause the announcer resumes in
an Eastwoodian tone, "Go on, keep buying Japanese cars." That
Mitsubishi Corporation's purchase of 51% of Rockefeller Group
had nothing to do with GM cars had little import i as an
executive at Pontiac's ad agency suggested, "If you just tell
Americans that American cars are better, they emotionally
won't bUy into it. You need to do something that will jolt
their feelings. ,,12
Feelings can range from shame, like that evoked from Lee
Iaqocca's 1990 commercials, in which he scolded viewers,
12Quoted in Advertising Age 3 February 1992, 18.
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"America is getting an inferiority complex about Japan ....
Everything from Japan is perfect .... Everything from America
is lousy." The recent ad for Crafted in Pride in the USA
Council instills fear; lines of unemployed men and women (one
holds an infant) emote anguish as images of crates marked,
"IMPORT" appear and a voice warns, "Buy American. And we
won't have to throw in the towel."
In addition to warnings from these industries, Time
magazine warned in 1986 that "Japan's banks are the world's
richest and most aggressive .... the invaders [also referred
to as the money masters from the East] are swallowing their
competitors .... Determined that the sun should never set on
their empires, the Japanese banks have also expanded in
Western Europe ..... [and] have descended on 'London".13 In a
later Time article titled "From Superrich to Superpower" words
like "political muscle" and "might", warn of the potential
influence of Japan's economic growth over domestic politics.
The article appeared a week after the Toronto economic' summit
at which Prime Minister Takeshita announced a $50-billion
foreign-aid package that made Japan the world's largest 'donor.
At the same time that the arti9le fretted over the
implications of such aid, however, it refers to the Japanese
_ as "a homogeneous island people in searcl~ of ways to put their
wealth and power to use" whose experience in dealing with
other nations "is still very primitive .... Part of the problem
1311.. August, 1986, 43.
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is that Japan has never articulated an exportable ideology,
such as democracy or Communism. As a homogeneous island
people who were long cut off from othe~nations, the Japanese
have an almost tribal sense of their own ideI1t:i.ty." 14_ _The__
-- ---------------~--- ------- -------q
implications of this Independence Day article were that, yes,
the Japanese have lots of money and say they will help the
world with it, but as an unsophisticated people, indeed a
"junior partner" of the US, "there are limits to how far Japan
can advance as a superpower .... No other nation has the
capability to replace Washington as the West's chief guarantor
of prosperity and peace." In this manner the myth of American
greatness .remains intact, while evidence of growing Japanese
power is marginalized by condescending analyses of the
Japanese culture; thus Japan is not seen as a potential equal
to the us.
Interested Americans who probed further into US-Japan
relations found much to select from in the late 1980s.
Several influential books appeared during this period,
creating what is referred to as the "revisionist"lS school of
thought on Japan. The principal tel)ets of revisionism present
M4 July, 1988, 29.
ls"Revisionism" ostensibly revises the "naive" notion that
Japan wanted to become more like us and other Western powers, and
that through continuous pressure for reform, the Japanese would
eventually adopt the rules of international free trade.
Revisionists claim that Japan has - revealed itself' to be too
different and hostile to ever be regarded as potential fair trading
pa~tners, and seek retributive measures in the form of industrial
policies to deal with Japan's economic might.
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a criticism of Japan's adversarial trade practices, its
barriers to high-value imports and foreign investment, and the
preeminence of an all-powerful "Japan,' Inc.", chaired by the
government, which guides and protects Japanese indus"t:!"Y.
Karel Van Wolferen, in his 1989 The Enigma of Japanese
Power, characterizes the Japanese as being undaunted by the
mandates of free trade. In response to those who might
surmise that Japan is "beating the West at its own game," Van
Wolferen charges that "they're not even playing the Western
game at all. " Instead, he observes, Japan is "single-
mindedly" pursuing aims of 'lts own, risking the enmity of the
world as it actively undermines Western industry. 16 Perhaps
enunciated more eloquently than your average Newsweek
headline, the revisionist thesis nevertheless assumes Japan to
be an "industrial juggernaut", with cultural and social roots
that make it impervious to change, thereby sowing distrust and
resentment. And among politicians, foreign policy experts and
corporate elites, the influence of this type of thinking about
Japan is growing.
Two recent PBS programs took this approach to US-Japan
trade issues. One, American Game, Japanese Rules, stressed
the departure by Japan from the model of free market economies
provided by the US. The other, "Losing the War with Japan",
purported to offer a "debate" and "contrasting" points of.
view, but the "experts" all maintained similarly that "Japan
1~an Wolferen 1989, 3.
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is mounting a carefully orchestrated attack on American
_industry." Chalmers Johnson, Pat Choate, James Fallows, Clyde
Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Lee Iacocca, a veritable
"Who's Who" of Japan-bashers and revisionists, provided the
framework" for debate, which never departed from th~ basic
tenet that the US is under attack and needs to fight back with
a national industrial policy that will "level the playing
field"; or as a displaced auto parts manufacturer put it, "We
need a Desert storm from American industry."l7
Revisionism has entered yet another genre beyond
scholarly journals, nonfiction books, and documentaries --
fiction. Michael- Crichton's Rising Sun is a murder mystery
that has enjoyed enormous sales; it was number one on the New
York Times bestseller list for three weeks, and has remained
near the top since. Karl Taro Greenfeld of The' Nation is
concerned, however, that this could be the only book about
Japan that many Americans will ever read. "If this is true,
its portrayal of the Japanese as inscrutable, technologically
proficient, predatory aliens who communicate through
telepathy, subsist on unpalatable foods, manipulate everything
and everyone and enjoy kinky, violent sex with white women
will be more influential in shaping opinions about Japan and
the Japanese than any of the more thoughtful and insightful
books recently pUblished. ,,18
17Frontline. PBS. 19 Novemb_er 1991.
1811 May 1992, 636.
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Greenfeld goes on to say that Crichton's characters speak
"in improbable paragraphs of exposition familiar to readers of
revisionist Japan experts." Fictional entertainment? That
<,
oecomes questIonable in view of the fact that Crichton-,,~dds a
lengthy bibliography citing the 'usuals'; quotes economic
statistics within the novel's dialogues, and warns the reader
in an afterword that the power of the US and quality of
American life is diminishing rapidly, and that we need to
respond to the Japanese challenge. Its status as harmless
fiction must also be questioned in light of the fact that the
publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, moved up the publication date by
2 months (to this past January) "in response to the sUbject's
timeliness. ,,19 Crichton's headlining novel thus shared the
stage with other events that stirred up pUblic resentment of
-
the japanese, such as the media's extensive re-enactment of
the'attack on Pearl Harbor, President Bush's headlining trip
to acquire "Jobs, jobs, and jobs," and the "Buy American" and
Honda-bashing craze that followed the disclosure of a Japane'se
politician's comments about "lazy" and "illiterate" American
workers.
The politician, a Mr. Sakurauchi, who is considered
particularly nationalistic by many Japanese, claimed in
February that America's declining competitiveness can be,
traced back to the'workers, who are 30% illiterate and lack a
work ethic. The upr~ar in the united states was phenomenal.
19Advertising Age 3 February 1992, 44.
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His observation about illiteracy was not that far off the
mark, but it was treated merely as an insult. When Barbara
Bush established her niche as crusader for literacy, the
illiteracy rate of roughly 25% was safe news. But that was
then, when a war on illiteracy was being waged, when all was
going to be mended by the First Lady. How dare the Japanese,
whom we helped' "grow up after the war, ,,20 whom we allowed to
take the lead,21 criticize the American 'worker? Senator
Ernest Hollings of South Carolina "joked" that American
workers should draw a picture of a mushroom-shaped cloud and
write underneath it "Made in America by lazy and illiterate
Americans and tested in Japan. ,,22
The incident, followed by the revelations of additional
p
Japanese criticism, made the front pages and the television
news across the country, prompting Nightline to do a
segment. 23 Introduced with footage of Honda-bashing and
picketing ~y American workers (specifically, one individual
who held up a sign that read, "Japan Says Your [sic] Lazy"),
the segment featured "experts" H. Ross Perot, corporate elite,
and Detroit Congressman Dingell, to illuminate the viewer on
WIacocca, 1988, 290.
21This is the subtitle of Clyde Prestowitz ' popular book
Trading Places. Prestowitz, a former commerce official, now head
of the Economic Strategy Institute, also writes for the
conservative Commentary and must be the most often quoted "expert"
on Japanese economic practices.
22Quoted in editorial, The Morning Call 6 March 1992:. A6.
~Nightline' ABC. 24 January 1992.
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the quality of the American worker. Perot was more willing to
suggest that Americans do score lower on international tests
and that education should be improved to deal with this lack
of parity (this was also part of his presidential campaign
.;
rhetoric). Dingell, who knows by whom his bread is buttered,
strongly denounced charges of American workers' inferiority.
The solution, they both concluded, was not that internal
problems should be addressed to a great extent; the problem is
with the foreign lobbyists. Both had obviously diligently
~
studied revisionist Pat Choate's Agents of Influence, in which
the author criticizes "revolving door" practices of former
J
trade officials, selling their influence and insider knowledge
to foreigners. Dingell also blamed the Japanese for dumping
products and closirig their own markets to foreign producers.
. ,
As usual, the form of the debate did not go beyond the
basic format of 'Japan news'. Lance Bennett, in News~ The
Politics of .Illusion, tells us that this is typical.
"Experts," those like Dingell with obvious political agendae,
..
resort to the ~ame simplistic stereotypes to explain events;
old myths are perpetuated in. new events, leaving little
motivation for further analysis. Are US workers inferior to
Japanese workers? This question can easily be dismissed with
ad hominem rationalizations, or, it can be explored
thoroughly. An alternative explanation for declining worker
quality might be the system of international trade that
encourage~.US producers to move capital elsewhere. There is
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no sense of obligation to nurture. domestic industry, to
enhance workers' skills, when this same labor can be purchased
elsewhere more cheaply. Corporations like GE (which made its
last radio in the US before 1972), Zenith and others are
applauded when they invest in lesser developed nations,
bringing the latter into the hallowed capitalist fold, but as
Seymour Melman notes, "Ignored in this calculation is the
diminished opportunity for productive employment in the US
that has become the major consequence of starting or
relocating production operations abroad.,,24
,
consider how the media treated the late 1980s purchases
of American entertainment firms by Japan's Sony and
Matsushita. Newsweek's October 9, 1989 cover, also adorned
wi~h a rendering of the Columbia statue, kimono-clad,
procla-imed, "Japan Invades Hollywood." Inside the article
stressed the fears that Japan is '''buying America' and taking
an invincible lead in trade and technology." "This time the
Japanese hadn't just snapped up another building; they had
bought a piece of America's soul." The article was, in
essence, yet ano'ther exposition of Japan's further "invasion"
into US dominions, reflecting the concern that the Japanese
would uses these acquisitions politically, to promote their
products and their points~of view.
When Matsushita gained control of MCA a year later,
Newsweek described the event in terms of gUlps and swallows;
24Melman, 1974, 98.
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pictures of King Kong and Jaws added a dramatic flair, and
were also quite reminiscent of wartime images of Japanese
viciousness. Time's headline, "Going Ape for Entertainment,"
also equipped with a photograph of the famous simian, recalled
the same images. other wartime metaphors are. always popular;
for e,xample, Fortune's headline read, "Where Japan will strike
Next."
Beginning in the mid-1980s the American entertainment
industry had experienced several changes in ownership, but it
was the Japanese ownership that inspired concerns about
cultural ~omination by an outsider. RCA's merger with GE, .
riddled with charges of insider trading, followed by GE's
later sale of it to Germany's Bertelsmann, the second largest
media conglomerate, passed relatively unnoticed in the New
York Times; an article or two appeareCl in the business
section. In 1989, Dutch Polygram Records acquired Island and
A&M record companies; articles appeared either in the business
section or toward the end of section one. As of December
1989, British Thorn EMI controlled Capital and SBK Records,
according to an article on page 14 of the business section.
However, when Sony acquired Columbia Pictures from Coca
Cola, twelve articles dealing with the takeover appeared
throughout September and October of 1989, ~everal on or near
the· front page. A year later, speculative articles, sixteen
in all, appeared almost daily in the Times, even before the
transaction transpired; twenty-three immediately after the
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acquisition. A year later, November 20, 1991, a headline
appeared on the front page, "Film Cj)anges After Japanese Buy
studio. II The article goes on to suggest that "the first movie
about Japan produced by a Japanese-ow~ed Hollywood studio and
the first test of the Japanese promise to leave creative
control in Hollywood ll did indeed take on "new overtones II since
the takeover, becoming more conciliatory toward potentially
negative images of the Japanese.
Professor Herbert Schiller, writing in The Nation,
suggests that the buyout of MCA by Matsushita had a beneficial.-2
effect: it caused the media to recognize that external powers
have the potential for cultural domination:
For a quarter of a century, more than a hundred
African, Asian and Latin American countries, most
of them in the Non-Aligned Movement, have protested
the flood of Western, mostly made-in-America media
products and imageS-inundating their cultures. In
countless resolutions adopted at innumerable inter-
national meetings, they have sought a less one-sided
flow of information. They have attempted unsuccess-
fUlly to defend their rights of self-expression and
to make their voices heard in the international
dialogue ... The world information order, then and
now, is a largely unhindered, one-way flow of
Amer~can cultural products around the world. 25 .
With concerns about other Japanese acquisitions, the
reaction to Sony and Matsushita's buyouts was to be expected.
But what concerns many critics is what is not mentioned in
or Newsweek: "the insatiable expansion and
pyramidization of image- and message-making properties and
25Herbert I. Schiller, IISayonara MCA" The Nation 31 December,
1990, 829.
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assets into huge structures of private mediaj,cultural
power .... The corporate voice dominates the land. Freedom of
speech is reinterpreted to mean the corporate speaker. The
issue is not the nationality of the media property owner.
---------
It
is the awesome concentration and control, domestically and
globally, by private economic power, of the apparatus of human
consciousness production. ,,26
Is Time-Warner, the world's largest media conglomerate,
any more responsive to humanistic concerns than a Japanese
conglomerate? Or a G~rman conglomerate, for that matter?
Coca Cola? Globalized capital is globalized capital, as Lewis
Lapham aptly suggests:
To the capitalist sensibility, the geopolitics of
money transcend the boundaries of sovereign states.
The world divides unevenly but along only one axis,
between the nation of the rich and of the
poor .... The American or Japanese plutocrat traveling
between the Beau Riva~e in Lausanne and the Ritz
Hotel in Madrid crosses not into another country but
into another province within the kingdom of wealth.
His credit furnishes him with a lingua franca
translated as readily into deutsche marks
into rials or yen or francs, buying more or less the
same food in the same class of restaurants, the same
amusements and the. same conversation, the same
politicians, dinner companions, newspaper
columnists, and accordian music. v
If this rather cozy scenario is accurate, then one must
wonder what role 'the common enemy Japan' plays. If we are to
believe that the world is truly.divided into two spheres, the
26Ibid, 829.
vLewis Lapham,· "Onward Christian Soldiers" in Sifrey and Cerf,
The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York, 1991)
458.
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rich and the poor, then why does Japan-"bashing" presume
national economic actors? It deflects attention from true
divisions, from the reality of unequal wealth. It unifies the
··'good'--against the--'-bad'-; it provides us with someone to hate,-
patriotically. UAW members who lose their jobs by the
thousand learn to hate the Japanese, not the transnational
interownership of automobile production facilities that
justifies global quests for lower production costs.
This past February, NBC News covered General Motorp'
prospective plant shutdowns and subsequent forfeiture of
74,000 jobs, but only after a lengthy story about the misery
of being a Japanese worker: cramped housing, "weekend
depression", "death by overwor}{", uncomfortable working
conditions. By the time the viewer got to the GM story, he
was already so thankful that he was, by God, an American, that
the impact of the massive plant closings was lessened
dramatically. stories about shutdowns and declining union
power are often framed in reference to "foreign (read,
Japanese) competition. " In Newsweek's article about the
layoffs, one reads that "GM's bombshell was probably overdue.
After years of dwindling market share and hemorrhaging balance
sheets, the company was conceding that markets lost to the
Japanese will never be regained, and trying to trim down to
fighting shape." Likewise, a Newsweek column from January of
1990 maintains that "IBM is fighting its Japanese and domestic
rivals simultaneously ..•• To become more price competitive,
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it's cutting costs. since 1986, its u.s. work force has
dropped 2-6,500 to 216, 000." (Not mentioned is the fact that
IBM Japan has traditionally been one of Japan's biggest
employers. )
In the name of "competition", against the foreign
"threat", Americans are urged to support corporate measures,
even if it means the loss of their jobs. They are urged to
support corporate measures by buying into the rhetoric, by
taking a sledge hammer to- a Honda, by venting their anger
outside of the system. This is how the myths of the Japanese
threat and of American supremacy are resolved and made
consistent with today's realities of America's loss of
hegemony; surely the Japanese are not successful because of
their culture, it is because they cheat, they do not play the
game fair. Protected by these charges are American
corporations whose activities and motives do not get
questioned and the as?umption that these corporations have a
right to extend their influences globally with no domestic
obligations. Protected, however, are the myths of Japanese
unworthiness and of American hegemony.
In the fOllowing section we will explore these issues in
an economic and comparative framework. Public o~inion polls
suggest a considerable preoccupation with the Japanese threat,
particularly in the demise of the soviet Union's military
threat. How threatening is Japan' seconomic growth? What
have Japanese economic actors done differently that has led to
87
this growth; are they as non-Western as their critics charge?
How closely do international economic figures adhere to the
propaganda?
5. Public Opinion Trends in the 1980s
Public opinion does not derive fi-om individual
opinions.~--;--;Rather-,---· a- -vague,· - inconsisten1;;-;---
unformulated, latent opinion ... is transformed by
propaganda through a true process of crystallization
into explicit opinion. . .
--Jacques Ellul, Propaganda:
The Formation of Men' s Attitudes
Not surprisingly, considering the way Japan is presented,
the ~ajority of Americans are concerned by the economic power
of the Japanese. As recently as October of 1991, when asked,
"Do you think Japan's economic power threatens the economic
well-being of the Unitea states or not?" 64% of those
Americans polled responded "yes".1 similarly, a nationwide
survey conducted by the Gallup organization between October 23
and November 15, 1990, presented a startling preoccupation
with the Japanese; for instance, both the "general pUblic" and
the "leadership" in the US, when asked whether they viewed the
economic power of Japan as a "critical threat to th~ vital
interests of the US," expressed that Japan was more of a
"critical" threat than the military power of the soviet
union. 2 Chart one in the appendix shows that 60% of the
pUblic and 63% of leaders3 believed that the economic power of
lAP poll of 1006 adults, cited in The Honolulu Advertiser, 24
November 1991, p. B1, in one of many articles dealing with the us-
Japan relationship as the Pearl Harbor anniversary approached.
2Rielly, 1991, 80.
3The
Congress,
-academia.
"leadership" ~ample included various officials. from
the Bush Administration, business, the media, and
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Japan will be a "critical" threat to US interests, but only
30% of the pUblic and 41% of leaders felt that economic
, .,.
__ competition from Europe constitutes a 'icritical" threat. A
Roper Organization poll for U. S .' News and World Report in
March of 1988 indicated similar results: 58% of Americans were
troubled by Japanese investment in the US, while only 37% had
«;:
similar concerns about European investment.4 Paradoxically,
Japan in.the same year ranked only a distant third on the list
of foreign investors in the US; British and Dutch investment
equalled four times .the investment of Japan. In the specific
area of foreign direct investment (FDI),5 Japan was ranked
third with $30.9 billion, behind the UK's $70.5 billion and
the Netherlands' $51.5 billion.. 1989 figures show that of the
$261.9 billion of FDI in the US, Japan possessed 12.3%, but
the UK possessed 28 ..2% and the Netherlands 20.6%.6 Charts
five and six illustrate more recent data that confirms the
continuation of this trend. While Japan's investment has
surpassed that of the Netherlands in only 1988, its FDI for
1989 reached $70 billion, a staggering figure, but much less
than British FDI, which surpassed $120 billion.
To put these figures into further perspective, the US
~ -
Under Secretary of Commerce Robert Ortner stated in 1988 that
4Japan Report, June 1988, 1.
5See definition of term on page 7, footnote 12.
6Glenn A. pitman and Sang T: Choe, "Attitudinal variations
Toward Japanese Investment in the US" SAM Advanced Management
Journal Summer 1989, 15.
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combined foreign ownership of US assets represented no more
than 5% of total US corporate assets. 7 Therefore Japanese
investment by itself constituted about six-tenths of 1% of us
assets. Europe's investment constituted nearly five times as
much at 2.8%, yet two years later, 60% of Americans polled
fear that the economic power of Japan would be a "critical
threat" to US vital interests. On a global level, as Charts
eight and nine indicate, thetiS and the UK were clearly the
dominant actors in terms of FDIi and in 1988, of the outwardly
investing countries, the UK alone accounted for 38% of all
international acquisitions.
Chart two in the appendix, also taken from the 1990
Gallup poll, indicates the degree of "warmness" felt by the
public toward"various nations. Note that Japan ranks 14th
since it's 9-degree fall from 1~86 levels; in 1986 Japan was
reqeived as warmly as West Germany was, but in the four years
since it fell to the ranks of South Africa. 8 The biggest
increase in warmness went to the Soviet Union, 33 degrees
above its 1982 level when as an "evil empire" it received the
lowest rating, directly below Iran and Cuba. In 1990 the
Soviet Union was ranked with the beacons of the Western world:
7Japan Report June 1988, 2.
8Actually South Africa had experienced a boost in warmness
since 1982; the widely proclaimed releas~.of Nelson Mandela soon
before this poll was taken may have led people to assume that South
Africa was no longer guilty of human rights violations, thereby
making them less of a vital US interest than the perceived Japanese
economic threat. I
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Canada, Great Britain and West Germany.
If we are to assume that the perception of a Japanese
economic threat is responsible for the pUblic's declining
warmth, then it would follow that the consistent placement of
Canada and Great Britain at the top must not be affected by
these same economic considerations. For instance, Chart ten
indicates that Canada was nearly as unreceptive of inward
direct investment, in the 1980's, as Japan had been. Though
one might quickly assess that Canada is perhaps not as
attractive to foreign' investors, this outcome was not entirely
without intention; Canada established a screening agency in
the early 1970's in response to pUblic concern about foreign,
particularly American, ownership ,of manufacturing industries.
In the 1980's Canada's share of DECD total inward flow of
direct investment accounted for 0.9%, only 0.2% above Japan's
Moreover, Chart fifteen indicates that although its
inward investment is comparably low, Japan has increased its
inflow of FDI from the US; in fact, this inflow from the US
dwarfs that of other nations. The charge that ' .informal'
cultural barriers limit firms from entering the Japanese
market has been sYmbolized most recently by the attempt of the
US firm Toys R Us to open in Japan. Its efforts had been
2To place this into context with other nations, Germany
receives 2.2~, the UK 13.6% and the US 53.8%, a jump from its level
of 14.9% during ~he 1960's. Canada exhibited a dramatic decrease
from its DECO share during the 1960's, 13%, which was 15 times as
its percentage in the 1980's.
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continually thwarted by local government regulations that
require large retailers to gain the consent of local
shopkeepers. 3 -American firms see this issue as a typical
indication of Japan's barriers to foreign investment, but the
Japanese perceive the situation otherwise. In many markets
one can find examples of successful foreign firms, they claim.
For instance, Coca-Cola has garnered more than 80% of the cola
market, firms in the microchip market such as _ Texas
Instruments, National semiconductors, and Motorola have on
average doubled their sales in Japan from 1986 to 1989; IBM
and Dupont are other examples of American-owned successes in
Japan. 4
Not only are these American firms finding niches in the
Japanese market, but now more and more high-tech companies are
setting up laboratories in Japan. 5 For years Japan has had
access to the best of America's technology by sending thousand
of engineers to be trained at American universities or by
""-
setting up research laboratories near leading centers of
industry such as Silicon Valley. critics attribute much of
Japan's industrial success to the relatively cheap transfers
of technology from the US, and indeed virtually all the
technology for basic and high-growth industries were imported
3Far Eastern Economic Review l~August 1990, 60.
• ,':':' , •. ¥ .-:.. -;-. :.---- •.•_~ •. - ~
-.4Yoshi Tsurumi, "The Japanese Backlash" Far Eastern Economic
Review 16 Aug 1990, 16.
5Susan ,Moffet, "Picking Japan's Research Brains" Fortune 25
March 1991, 84.
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as a central component of Japan's postwar industrial policy.6
Last year Texas Instruments opened a basic research
laboratory in Japan. others ,; such as Upj ohn, Dow Corning, IBM
and Kodak have already lured Japanese scientists away from
Japanese corporate and government research and development.
What many Americans also do not realize is that in the late
1980's American companies bought more technology from Japan
than .from any other nation save Great Britain; in 1990 the US
spen~ $~91 million to license technology from Japan, up from
$89 million in 1981 (Moffet 1991, 85). Clearly the reluctance
of the Japanese to sell tneir expertise is not geared toward
the us.
Chart fifteen, which illustrates Japan's inward FDI,
suggests that, although the figures don't approach the
cumulative flow of investment by Japanese firms in the us
(Chart nineteen shows this to be more than $70 billion at the
end of 1989), the us has experienced substantial increases in
\
its investments in Japan, parti~ularly in 1987 and 1988 when
the annual flow increased from $488 million in 1986, to $938
million in 1987, to $1774 million in 1988, increases of nearly
100% per year. Cumulative investment by the us at the end of
1988 totaled $6288 million; after the us came switzerland with
(US) $928 million and German and the UK with $546 million and
$518 respectively.
critics also point to Japan's trgde barriers that limit
6Johnson 1982. 27.
94
the importing of foreign goods. Chart five indicates the
tariff level cuts for the US, EC, Japan and Canada after the
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, as reported in the Economic
Report of the President, 1989. Even after con?iderable cuts,
Canada's tariff rates for industrial products were nearly
three times those of Japan. Spec:L,::tic.attention has been paid
to Japan's placement ,of high tariffs on high-value finished
manufactures; before the Tokyo Round tariff cuts, the tariff
level was 12.5%, after the cuts, 6%, quite comparable to the
\ .
US's 5.7~. Canada, however, had imposed a 13.8% tariff on
finished manufactures, 8.3% after the cuts. Europe's post-cut
tariff of the same is 6.9%, still higher than Japan's.
Charts twelve and thirteen illustrate that 1982 was a
year in which the US and Japan started experiencing
considerable differences in trade balances, and the public
generated a low level of "warmth" in response, 53 degrees.
----_./
Chart twelve (US, EC and Japan trade balances) illustrates
graphically many of the implications contained in Chart
thirteen (US, merchanpise exports and imports), particularly
the relative trade defici~ of the US. During the period in
which the considerable differences became evident, however,
only 12.5% of Japan's GNP was gained from exports; West
Germany gained 23.4% and the UK gained 22.2%, but the latter
nations received higher ,levels of "warmth". 7 In 1986,
"warmth" toward Japan rose to 61 degrees, an 8-degree jump
7Fortune, 26 February 1990, 60.
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from 1982, yet the US trade deficit with Japan in 1986 was
$54.4 billion, three times the deficit reported in 1982.
Since peaking in 1987 Japan's trade surplus with the US fell
from $53 billion to less than $40 billion in 1990, when Japan
became the world ' s third largest importer. US exports to
Japan have risen dramatically, faster than the growth of US
exports to the rest of the world; yet Americans felt less
warmly to the Japanese in 1990 than they did in 1986 when the
US def.icit was larger; 71% claimed that Japan practiced
"unfair trade".
Chart thirteen, which demonstrates U.S. trade balances
with various countries, show that from 1981 to 1990 the US has
maintained a trade deficit relative to Japan, peaking in 1987
at $57 billion, but shrinking since that year. It was
previously mentioned that, in general, Japanese imports have
increased by about 40% annually; US exports alone to Japan
increased 100% from 1985 to 1989. 8 still, however, Lee
Iacocca expressed in Novemb~r of 1990 that "we're heading for
economic disaster with a U.S. market that is wide open to the
Japanese while the Japanese market remains effectively closed
to us. 9
Consider these other trends: In Chart 16 a per capita
comparison reveals that, in 1990, Japanese bought more U.S.
8 "Japan-US Trade Deficit Continues Downward Trend" Japan
Report March·1990, 1.
9Harvard Business Review 1990, 184.
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products $426 per person -- than Americans bought Japanese
products -- $372 'per person. Japan also imports a higher
percentage of US goods among its imports from industrialized
countries than the US imports from Japan. Moreover, 60%
(compared to less than 25% in 1980) of those US sales are of
manufactured goods chemicals, aluminum, aircraft,
scientific instruments, computers and many other expensive
"high-tech" products, more than the US sells to Germany and
France combined. lO
The decline in the trade deficit, the increased US access
to Japanese internal markets, and the sizeable tariff level
cuts during the Tokyo Round of GATT negotations are evidence
that Japan has, at the least, become less of an economic
'threat', yet the attitudes of the public do not reflect the
changes that have occurred in the international economy; nor
do they reflect the economic practices of other western
nations that are just as much, if not more, in violation of
'free trade' practices.
,
The Japan Economic Institute in Washington, D. C. suggests
that this type of outcome is not surprising because of the
extensive media attention devoted to Japanese investment and
practices. "Over the last two years virtually every major
•
American 'business magazine, news weekly, and newspaper has run
at least one cover story or feature article on what Japanese
lOBernard Gordon, "The Asian-Pacific Rim" Foreign Affairs
America and. the World edition, 1990/1991, v. 70, 154.
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direct investors are doing in the united states, particularly
in the manufacturing sector, but rarely does the coverage of
European or Canadian investment go beyond individual
transactions, usually takeovers".ll Bill Powell, Asia
Economics Editor for Newsweek adds, "In the Eurocentric
American mind, Canadians, British and French may be
foreigners, but they are distinguished as individuals.
Campeau goes bust, not the Canadians. Maxwell strikes again,
not the Brits. But the Japanese have strange names ... and
people generalize: The Japanese bought the factory" .12
These observations are accurate. In March of 1989,
before Sony or Matsushita acquired film studios in the US, a
Newsweek headline warned, "Time, Inc. isn't alone in going
Hollywood. Japan wants a piece of the movie business. ,,13
When Sony did acquire Columbia Pictures later that year, the
cover of the October 9, 1989 issue proclaimed, "Japan Invades
Hollywood" and included an article on ways to "fight back" by
getting "tougher on trade". These articles, ironically
written or cowritten by Powell, appeared in an ongoing series
of articles, "The Asian Challenge," launched in February of
llJapan Report June 1988, 2; for example, when Matsushita
invested $6.6 billion in MCA 1> soon after Sony acquired Columbia
pictures often the media stressed the implications of a monolithic
"Japan's Hollywood" rather than. the details of the individual
actors in the transaction.
12Bill Powell, "Japan's Bosses in America," Business Month
August 1990,29.
1320 March 1989, 48; italics added.
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1989 to assess the implications ··of America's "selling to
fortress Japan. ,,14 In comparison, Time presented on its
September 22, 1986 cover "The Man Who Captured CBS," Laurence
Tisch, along with a flat~ring article about how this "savvy
manager and investor made billions." Similarly, Newsweek
wrote of "The Mysterious Italian [Giancarlo Parretti] Who Took
Hollywood By storm ,,15, and that "[Rupert] Murdoch Feels the
Squeeze. ,,16
Examples abound to further illustrate the singularly
dark, monolithic image of the Japanese in the global economic
arena. Whereas Western capitalists are portrayed as
individualized, entrepreneurial, savvy, risk-taking, with
persona1 lives that can become the stuff of tabloids, their
Japanese counterparts appear en masse, subordinate to a
"hidden Japan,,17 or a '.'Japan, Inc." that· directs economic
decision making. For many Americans, world events are taught
by the popular mass media. Whether its from Time magazine,
CBS' 60 Minutes, or from Lee Iacocca's widely read'Nippon-
aphobic' autobiography (Which sold more than 6 million copies
worldwide by the time Iacocca' s. second widely read
autobiography appeared in print), the message too often
1413 February 1989, 3.
1530 April 1990, 46.
1629 October 1990.
17This term appeared in a cover story in Business Week,
December 1991.
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received is that Japan has ruthless aspirations for economic
control and that the US has been singled out for assault. And
unless one has access to more balanced information with which
to me~sure this message, the slant of the media bec0mes·the
generally accepted position.
A study appeared in the 1989 issue of the Society for
Advancement of Management Journal which dealt with attitudinal
variations toward Japanese investment in the US. The authors
note the irony of pUblic opinion toward Japanese investment,
considering the extent of Dutch and British investment that
exists, but which registers little pUblic debate.
The results of their study indicated that those groups or
individuals who were more highly'" educated tended to have
positive attitudes toward FOr. Presumably, those with a
knowledge of economic and world affairs had a greater
understanding about the nature 0; foreign investment and did
not view FOI as a threat. On the other hand, those in the
working class, with lower levels of education, were more
likely to harbor anti-foreign investment attitudes. 18 Results
from a 1984 Gallup poll indicated similarly that those more-
likely to rate Japan as a "dependable" trade partner tended to
be college-educated, affluent, male, from Western states, and
4
from professional or business households. 19 Clearly these
.~
factors do not describe a midwestern autoworker who fears
18Pitman and Choe 1989, 16.
19Japan Report 1984, 1 .
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losing his job to foreign competition. '
Chart two in the appendix indicates that 65% of' the
pUblic thought that the protection of American jobs was a
"very important" foreign policy goal for the US to pursue.
Less important for the pUblic were protecting weaker nations
against foreign aggression (ironic, considering· that the-
timing of the poll coincided with the decision to send troops
to the Middle East to protect Kuwait from Iraqi aggression),
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and containing
communism. Also low on the scale was reducing our trade
deficit with foreign countries; more leaders found this to be
a very important goal. This would suggest that the American
public is less accepting of further Japanese investment when
they feel personally affected by Japanese economic
competition, rather than when the nation's international
financial position is at stake. Chrysler Chairman Lee
Iacocca, as a spokesman for an "affected" industry, taps this
resistance ,when he claims that Japan's adversarial trade
"spells American unemploYment" .20
A recent commentary in Business Week titled "Japan's
Hollywood: More Ominous Than it Seems" discussed the
20Another paradox: The Big Three carmakers closed dozens of
plants, mostly 'in the Midwest and surrounding states, eliminating
more than 250,000 jobs. Related industries such as steel, rubber
and auto parts lost another 250,000 (Kenney and Florida 1991, 25).
companies blamed the actions on high-wage union workers and headed
for lower cost regions .and better business surroundings, ?lnd
American workers lashed out.at foreign competition such as Japan.
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implications of Sony's acquisition of Columqia Pictures and
.,
Matsushita's acquisition of MCA, Inc. Since together the
companies also provide leadership in computers, high-
definition television, and camcorders (industries lost to the
Japanese), the author predicted that "by managing both sides
of the business, Japanese companies have every intention of
ending up in the driver's seat". 21 The impact of this type of
speculation on pUblic perceptions is illustrated in the
following question in Parade magaz~ne:
"The movie "Tora! Tqra! Tora!" has been shown in this
country for many years on December 7, the
anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. I
understand it will not be shown in 1991. Is that
because Japanese companies are buying up the u.S.
movie industry and dictating what the American
people should watch?" (14 April 1991)
This question is indicative of the media'~ treatment of
Japanese investment. "When the u.S media write about Japanese
investments in the u.S .... such reports give the impression
that the Japanese business community has teamed up to buy
America", observes Washington lobbyist· Tomohitoshinodo. 22
The impression left behind of a monolithic and uniquely
,
Japanese economic onslaught is inaccurate; in international
economic terms, it's the US' worldwide deficts and relative
decline that are the major issues. The Japanese "straw man" /
allows the pUblic to take refuge .in the notion tht their
21Neil Gross, "Japan's Hollywood: More Ominous Than it Seems"
Business Week 15 November 1990, 115.
22Harvard Business Review 1990, 187.
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problems "have been caused by "unfair foreigners." In their
myopic analysis of the situation, us busineS;~~n and other
leaders wrap themselves in the cloak of "national interest",
sOliciting support for the protection of their capital and
their industries. Ignored in this process are, for example,
the benefits that have come from Japanese investment,
particularly when so ;many domestic interests have stressed
financial innovation over industrial innovation. Also
sidetracked is how the us has become so dependent on Japanese
(or any foreign) capital to begin with. Michael Borrus, a
professor in international business and economics at the
University of California at Berkeley observes:
"
Most Japanese investment ought not to concern us. It
could be that Columbia Pictures will corrupt Sony rather
than vice versa. The question is, "does Japanese
investment make it more difficult for Americans to own
their homes or keep their jobs, and so far that hasn't
been the case. 23
Looking Beyond The Threat: Benefits achieved by Japanese
investment
Japanese investment in the us has created jobs, improved
the productive capacity of several industries, and has
injected capital into both a declining real estate market and
a rising national debt. When Americans learn of the $3.4
billion spent on Columbia Pictures, the $846 million invested
into the. Rockefeller Center, the $91 billion spent on us
government securities, or the more than 1000 manufacturing
23schlender, 1990, 1~0.
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plants that Japanese firms are running, little attention is
paid in the mainstream press to the benefits of this
investment. 24
A reference was made earlier to the fact that even a
cultural mecca such as Disney World depends on Japanese
investment to finance 9rowth.~ Another prominent example is
the Andrew Jergens Co., the 106-year-old maker of soap and
hand lotions. Sold in 1987 to Japan's Kao Corp. for $300
million, Jergens was immediately able to increase its
marketing and research a~d development bUdgets. Or the 100-
year-old Mentholyptus Co., Inc., sold to Osaka-based Rohto
Pharmaceutical Company; with this one transaction Japan has
become the biggest single market for Mentholyptus products,
surpassing even the US. 26
Other industries have benefitted as well; in 1991,
Japanese-owned plants in the US included 66 steel works, 20
rubber and tire factories, 8'major automotive assembly plants
(which make 21% of all the cars built in the US) and more than·
270 auto-parts suppliers. The Japanese have invested more
than $25 billion into US heavy industry and created more than
100,000 jobs at a time when American manufacturing had begun
abandoning their production facilities for more profitable
24SchlenderJ 1990, ~OO.
25The Economist 1 December 1990, 72.
2~arc Beauchamp, "We're All Rejuvenated" Forbes 19 March 1990,
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regions. 27
\,.,.
Several states are trying to attract these Japanese
firms, causing controversy for domestic manufacturers who
charge that Japanese investment in industry is influenced by
the wave of protectionism that has swept the US and by the
'--
vigorous enforcement of import laws. 28 Higgins agrees that
many of the partnerships, joint ventures, and other business
deals between American and Japanese companies have arisen out
of of the Japanese fear of government limits on steel imports
and steel-intensive products such as autos. 29 Indeed part of
the attractiveness of the US market, along with its vastness
and its political stability, is that FDI is able to sidestep
many of the protec1j.ionist J measures to "limit imports. 30
However, this is no different than the US's motives for
expanding FDI in Canada--to protect its market shares in the
light of the Canadian governments efforts to increase import
limitations on US goods.
Internal issues that have led to US dependence on Japanese
VKenney and Florida, 1991, 25.
28Richard G. Newman and K. Anthony Rhee, "Midwest Auto
1 •Transplants: Japanese Investment strategles and Policies" Business
Horizons March-April 1990, 63.
29Higgins, 1989, 65.
30Geraldo M. Vasconcellos and Richard J. Kish, "Cross-Border
Mergers and Acquisitions and International Capital Flows: US-Japan"
Department of Finance, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. Research
Paper. January 1991, 5.
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capital
Foreign investment, regardless of its parent, has become
vital for the US as it faces declining trade balances,
financial strength, and comparative _advantage in industry.
Between 1987 and 1989, about 75% of Japan's net capital
outflow went to the US; this inflow constituted more than half
of US borrowing from abroad. 31 Japan' s capital has been a
major source of capital to finance the federal deficit that
has accrued in the 1980's; of all the US government
obligations held by foreigners, Japanese investors own 21%, or
$91 billion worth. Iacocca calls this "bondage, Japanese
style", the "buying up" of Treasury bonds; yes, the Japanese
have largely financed our national debt, but only because US
policies and deficit spending made the purchases both
attractive to the Japanese and other foreigners for their high
-interest rates, and vital to the US.
Americans are often alarmed to learn that eight of the
ten biggest banks in the world are Japanese. In both
California and New York, Japanese banks account for more than
a quarter ~f total bank assets; overall in the US Japanese
bank assets account for 11% of the country's total. 32 The
response to such information is typical -- the fear that Japan
has gained too much leverage; but not enough emphasis is
31Scott Miller-/-,J.,ilsqueeze in Japan Imperils US Growth" American
Banker 16 April 1990, 10.
32Schlender, 1990, 100.
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placed on the American decisions that have facilitated
Japanese bank expansion. The same decisions to deregulate the
banking industry within. the US apply as well to foreign
operators of US banks., For instance interst:ate banking,
prohibited by the McFadden Act of 1927, is now permittedJon a
regional or national basds in all but five states. The reason
behind this deregulatory move was ostensibly to lead to a more
competitive banking system, able to . withstand regional
recessions and to'me.!=t foreign competition. 33 Also revised is
the Glass-steagall Act, a 60-year-old federal statute that
separated commercial from investment banking. As competition
rose in the early 1980's from nonbank providers of profitable
financial services and the cost of funds sQbsequently
increased, commercial bankers were forced to seek expanded
income opportunities from related activities such as security
sales or financial advising. 34 The Japanese operating in the
us have received the same benefits of deregulation as the-
American banks have, or as the British have for that matter.
One competitive advantage that Japan has had, though, is
its ability to raise funds with' which to invest due to ,a
surplus of capital in the domestic economy. Saving in Japan
has been typically much higher than in the us. since the
1950's the, net private savings have decreased from 8.2% to
33Donald T. shvage, "Interstate Banking Update" The Bankers
Magazine JUI~J~t 1989, 28.
34Richard M. Whiting, "Glass-Steagall: Is Repeal Necessary?"
The Bankers Magazine January-February 1991, 37.
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5.4% of the net national product. similar data from Japan
reveals that the personal savings rate has typically been more
than 20%. From 1968 to 1977, the per;od in which the US began
/'
\ /
to experience its general decline in relative economic power,
the us personal savings rate was 6.9% while Japan's averaged
,
about 20%, peaking in 1974 at 24%.35
.
While us banks are suffering from large exposure to third
world debt36 , bad loans from the banking and S&L crises37 , and
low us saving rates, their search for capital has provided the
Japanese with the opportunity to bUy into the Ame~ican market
and to take advantage of us deregulatory decisions. 38
other internal characteristics are mentioned as well to
.,.
illustrate the manner in which Japan has become so dominant in
our own economy. Says Michael ciesinski, director of North
35Miyohei Shinohara, Industrial Growth« Trade« and Dynamic
Patterns in the Japanese Economy (Tokyo, 1982) 156.
36It has been estimated that between 25 and 40% of the increase
in the u.s. current account deficit, and the subsequent need to
borrow from abroad, during the 1970's can be attributed to the
third world debt crisis (Gerald Epstein, "Mortgaging America" World
Policy Journal winter 1990, 37).
37 37Consider a recent segment on 60 Minutes which focused
on a particularly sizeable S&L loss being handled by the Resolution
Trust Corporation. Among millions upon millions of dollars lost
due to a certain Colorado S&L was the fact that the RTC had to sell
the S&L building itself at a loss. The segment concluded with the
following clincher: unable to find an American buyer to pay the
full $40 million, the RTC was forced to sell it to the Taiwanese
for $8 million•.. "you [the taxpayer] will be paying the
difference." The S&L crisis was caused within us borders, by
excessive us deregulation, by us citizens~ yet the closing remark
of the inflammatory segment implicate~ Taiwan.
38Linda sieg, "capital Rules Pave Japan's Way into US" American
Banker 26 September 19'89, 8.
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American operations for Semiconductor Equipment and Materials
International, a trade group representing manufacturers
worldwide, "Acquisitions in the American equipment industry
often reflect lack of resolve to nurture home-grown
technologies, rather than ruthless behavior on the part of the
Japanese. I wouldn't characterize their investment as
predatory; they are simply smart investors .... The US industry
has needs that aren't being met by domestic capital markets,
so where do you turn?". 39
....
A common observation made by Japanese officials is the
very nature of the American domestic capital market which
encourages short-term investment, as opposed to the more
nurturing style of Japanese investment. Ryuhi Kitamura,
president of a New York subsidiary of the Japanese trading
giant C. Itoh & Co., ·observes, "If I have one criticism, it is
that the U.S. encourages opportunism. To the Japanese
industries are like babies, and you never sell a baby for
survival. Here it's as if every company is adopted.
Americans sell their businesses too easily. ,,40 )
Gerald Epstein in his article "Mortgaging America"builds
on this observation and presents another vi~w of internal
problems that have created our dependence on foreign capital.
He tells us:
While foreign direct investment in the US has raised
39Schlender, 1990, 101 ~
40Ibid.
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\concern in many circles, it is, paradoxically, US direct
investment abroad that provides a better explanation of
America ' s growing international debt problem. 41
He observes that even though FDI in the US has grown rapidly
in the past decade, us direct investment abroad has been
growing even faster sinc,e the mid-1980's, "reflecting an
apparent decision by many large American corporations to
reduce their commitment to the US as a production site". This
issue has been discussed in reference to industry transplants,
whose directors chose1to maintain comparative cost advantage
by moving abroad. Epstein charges that this phenomenon has
not only lost US jobs, but has exacerbated the US trade
deficit in terms of an ensuing "boomerang effect"; increased
production and exports on the part of U. S . corporations
outside the US have meant reduced production and exports for
companies within the US. In some cases this has also resulted
in increased US imports from foreign-based multinationals.
For example, Texas Instruments employs 5000 people in Japan to
make semiconductors, almost half of which are exported, many
to theUS, and US corporate production in Taiwan is
responsible for more than one-third of Taiwan's trade surplus
with the US. 42 ,
Furthermore, studies indicate that US multinationals tend
to reduce their investment at home as they increase their
investment abroad, and'for every dollar invested abroad that
~Epstein 1990, 34.
42Ibid, 35.
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would have'been invested at home, the US loses employment and
tax income. ,certainly the loss of US jobs translates to tax
II
losses, but losses also arise due to tax advantages enjoyed by
multinationals. These include foreign tax credits for taxes
paid to foreign governments; if the foreign tax on profit is
lower than the US tax rate, then tqe us receives the
difference. Also some multinationals are able to defer tax
payments until the profits are repatr.iated back to the US; in
the meantime firms can reinvest profits in foreign countries
with lower tax rates to avoid US taxes indefinitely. Epstein
cites a recent study of more than 12,000 foreign subsidiaries
of 453 US firms; 8277, or 69%, paid no dividends, interest,
rent, or royalties to their parent corporations in 1984,
thereby generating no US tax liability on foreign earnings.
In light of these facts, a comment by revisionist Clyde
Prestowitz seems particularly ironic:
Does a new Japanese auto plant in the U.S. actually
contribute to the wealth of the nation? Not if it
results in the closure of U.S.' plants, or if a large
portion of its components come from overseas. Not
if the foreigh investor contrives to pay few, if
any, taxes. 43
He and other noted Japan-bashers might even welcome recent
developments in the Japanese economy which. threaten to curtail
outward investment. A tight money policy in Japan has placed
... pressure on banks ...to reduce lending and to slow the growth..Q.t ..,_
the money supply. "Japan's days as the world's banker are
52.
43clyde Prestowitz, "Commentary" Business Month October 1990 ,
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over; Japan will not be the lender of last resort," says an
economist at the Deutsche Bank Group in Tokyo.#
Japan's large capital outflows are depressing the yen and
increasing Japanese interest rates. Japan's current account
surplus has narrowed by more than one-third since 1987; in the
6-month period ending in September 1990, the surplus was cut
by nearly half from the September 1989 level, to US $15.4
billion, despite the weakening of the dollar. 45 The Bank of
Japan raised official discount rates four times in 1990, from
2.5% to 5.25% to attract domestic capital from foreign markets
and to keep the yen from declining. 46
Japan's capital outflow to the US has helped to keep
American interest rates low, reducing the cost of borrowing in
the US, but the rates were still higher than Japan's, thus
continuing to attract investors to US markets. But as the
dollar continues to fall and Japanese interest rates are
forced up, the US might witness considerable reduction in
Japanese investment. Already a decline in Japan's purchase of
all foreign bonds has appeared; in the first half of 1990
Japanese investors bought $10.2 billion in US Treasury and
other foreign bonds, down from $39.1 billion a year earlier.~
44Miller, 1990, 10.
45Susumu Awanohara, "Yen For Home" FaIit Eastern Eccinomic Review
22 November 1990, 69.
4~iller, 1990,' 10.
~Awanohara, 1990, 69.
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Interest rates are also rising in Europe, particularly iri
Germany, which further threaten to lure away Japanese capital
from Amer~can markets, a prospect which frightens many in
financial industries who have relied heavily on Japanese
investment in us assets, and who recognize that to compensate
for the loss, US could come under pressure to either save more
(i.e., consume less) or face higher interest or tax rates.
Some criticize Japanese investors for the impending "wholesal~
withdrawal of their capital from the US" as vehemently as
those who criticize the original investment, not recognizing
that Japanese investors, like American investors, are heavily
influenced by global economic conditions, not just those in
the US. R. Howe observed in 1975,
Us firms are losing their enthusiasm for investment
in Europe. Its inflation, its p'olitical
instability, its growing socialization of the
economy, its need to import raw materials: all are
combining to make US companies look elsewhere for
growth opportunities .... In the future, predicts
John Ross, a Bank of America vice-president, US
investors will increasingly favor the relatively
rich and hospitable developing countries, mainly
Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, and
Mexico. 48
-. . . / .To repeat the lmpllcatlons from the prevl0us section, Japanese
firms are not as "nonWestern" as their critics would imply;
their investment has been typical of other capitalist powers.
In response to trade protection, many have opted to invest
within the US to protect their market shares against trade
48R. Howe, "US Investment in Europe:
Vision January 1975, 47.·
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The Glow Wears Off"
barriers. And they have found the US to be a profitable haven
for their surplus capital at a time when the US was highly
'dependent on it.
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6. Japanese Capitalism: How Non-Western Is It?
Van Wolferen in The Enigma of Japanese Power sees the
government as being too dominant over the economy, and he
resents the claim that Japan is a IIfree market" nation. He
suggests instead that Japan's system is neither Western
capitalism nor communism, but rather a third type, a
capitalist pevelopmental state (CDS). The strength of a CDS
is in its partnership between bureaucrats and industrialists
in a combined effort to stimulate areas of promise through
fiscal policies and examination of business trends.
This system for p1;'omoting growth in postwar Japan is
often tacked on to the Western claim that Japan's success
resulted in essence from Japan's position as a "free-rider" on
the US postwar trade alliance. 49 This has allowed Japan to
enjoy ready access to Western export markets, relatively cheap
transfers of technology, and US military defense at virtually
no cost. On this last issue, in October of 1991 Congress
passed a nonbinding resolution callihg for the Japanese
government to pay all yen-denominated expenses related to U. S.
troops in Japan. The general public in Japan interpreted such
a demand as extreme and oblivious to their own historical
interests; the continuing presence of US troops was, for many,
merely a continuation of the postwar Occupation. The US's
,assumption of Japan's defense was incidental to its
containment strategy vis a vis' the Soviet Union, yet the'
49Johnson, 1982, 15.
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reaction in America has been that Japan has been getting a
free ride on defense.~
Many other sources of Western contention toward Japan
exist; some have already been alluded to throughout this
paper. The common implication of the arguments is that Japan
has achieved success in a manner different from Western
economic powers, that Japan's methods are decidedly
antithetical to the tenets of liberal trade that is practiced
by the West. Van Wolferen charges that Japan does not play
the Western game of free trade; but what exactly is the
Western game, and where does Japanese significantly differ?
A comparison of 19th century Pax Britannica and 20th century
Pax Americana with Japan'~ rise to economic po~cent
decades illustrates that the former were uniquely able to
dominate the global economy.
Pax Brittanica
Great Britain achieved economic ascendancy only after the
period of Dutch mercantilism of the early 1800's laid
foundations for liberalized trade. The Dutch comparative
advantage was in its shipping industry, and in order to
maximize the benefits of shipping, merchants sought to
minimize government formalities, 'such as duties and tariffs,
SOTakeshi, 1991, 20.
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thus increasing opportunities for freer trade~5t
The Dutch ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam had each been
dedicated to particular commodities, mostly perishable and
nonstandardized, and thus best suited to shorter voyages,
which the Dutch were uniquely able to perform most efficiently
until transportation in general became more efficient and
widespread; the pivotal advantage of the Dutch direct trading
role thus became less important. The Bri tish ascended to
economic hegemony because they moved into manufacturing goods _.
rather than trade alone. Machinery, railways, division of
~ labor, and a spirit of enterprise became the dominant sources
of economic power.
Protectionism under mercantilism was prevalent for
centuries before Britain's rise to economic hegemony in the
19th century. From 1480 to 1650 the international economy was
defined by goals of national power' and wealth; raw materials
were prevented from exiting, particularly silver and gold, and
imports of manufactured goods were limited in order to keep
domestic prices low, to limit the ability of others,to develop
abroad and to inhibit potential foreign competitors. 52
Machinery received protection from foreign competition
through restrictions on machinery exports and the emigration
StCharles P. Kindlebe:r:ger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western
Europe" in Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth (New
York, 1987) 87.
nFrieden and Lake, 1987~ 69.
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of artisans, a practice supported by many business interests
in order to discourage .competition,53 but which was later
deemed to be harmful in that machinery was still smuggled out
of the country, and at a high premium, which led to the
profitable reproduction abroad. In addition, those artisans
.~
who did leave the nation tended to not return for fear of
reprisal. Thus the British soon learned the cost of
protecting their comparative advantage.~
Trade continued to play a large part in the Pax
Britannica, the period of prosperity and free trade under
British hegemony. As the world's most advanced nation,
extensive prote~tion was no longer necessary and was believed
to inhibit growth. Thus British capitalists could shed the
more archaic, mercantilist (and costly) forces of imperialism,
and urged others to do the same. However, as British economic
historian P.J. Cain points out, free trade retained a
mercantilist sense in that Britain was unrivaled in its
economic and political power; persuading others to adopt the
tenets of free trade such as comparative advantage ensured
that British hegemony would remain intact. Trade partners
could not compete on that level and were thus relegated to
primary production. About these arrangements Marx wrote that
,
"open door policies" such as Britain practiced, served to
53p.J. Cain, Economic Foundations of British Overseas
Expansion. 1815-1914 (London, 1980) 20.
~Kindleberger, 1987, 87.
118
create the international division of labor, making colonial
possessions into "granaries ll to
capacity for British exporters. 55
improve the manufacturing
_-.5
Britain dominated Chinese markets, first through the East
India Company, whichmonopolizedOtrading rights in the region,
then through individual traders. After Commodore Perry's
IIblack shipsll forced open the ports of Japan, British interest
were soon to follow. Economic ties were created elsewhere,
inspiring local development and industry in order to serve new
markets.
At the end of the 19th century, during the Industrial
Revolution, the British extended their colonial possessions
and territorial holdings, providing an expansion of exports
and trade. 56 From 1850 to 1880, the period when Great
.Britain assumed economic leadership, world trade grew 2.7
fold; alone, British exports grew 3.4 times. London became
the center of international finance and the pound sterling
.. '
became the international currency with which other nations
preferred to hold external assets, to settle transactions or
to intervene in the market. 57
But after 1875, Britain faced relative decline compared
with the US and Germany. Heavy foreign investment abroad by
~Cain, 1980, 14.
. 56In 1860 Great Britain possessed 2.5 million square miles of
holdings, mostly in Africa and the Pacific; by 1899 the holdings
increased to 9.3 million square miles.
~Shinohara,1982, 57.
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British producers cre9-ted new competitors, and British exports'
fell in their share of world trade. For instance, from 1851
,
to 1855 21% of Great Britain's exports went to the US; from
1861 to 1895 this dropped to 10-13%, and from 1901 to 1935, 5%
to 7%.58 The US had originally relied heavily on Great
Britain for its own development, but after the turn of the
century the dependence decreased rapidly as the US developed
its own ~rosperity.
Though Britain began to experience trade deficits with
these emerging powers, for a time the impact was offset by
profits from foreign acquisitions and from 'safer' colonial
markets. Nevertheless, pressure was applied by British
business interests on Germany and the US to ease their
protectionist barriers behind which they were growing. "Fair
traders", thos~ in declining industries such as wool, iron,
and agriculture, -sought tariffs from foreign imports.
Preferential treatment, however, was afforded to those in the
British empire. By 1914 appeals for protectionism and
preferential policies grew more vociferous in the name of
,,r
"national interest", what Cain observes as a "manifestation of
the growing anxiety at the relative decline of Britain's
industrial strength. ,,59
Thus World War I served as a watershed in the history of
British dominance; weakened by destruction, both Britain and
~Shinohara, 1982, 59.
~cain, 1980, 68.
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Germany had to buy from the US and to borrow heavily from US
banks, neglecting their own economic activities. The US was
then in a position to penetrate markets previously held by
these and other Europeans. Prior to WWI the US was a net
150.
•debtor to Europe; at the end, the US was the principal
creditor, setting the stage for the post-WWII Pax Americana.
Pax Americana
since WWII the us has been the dominant economic and
political forge among Western nations. While the us emerged
from the war greatly strengthened, the economic and productive
,..,
capacity of many Allies had been greatly reduced. As late as
1950 output in West Germany and Japan had not returned to
prewar levels; by contrast, us output in 1950 was two-thirds
larger than its pre-war level with average annual growth rates
of 4.8%.60
A postwar American-led international economic order was
developed within which trade would flourish; features included
Marshall Plan assistance, the International Monetary Fund, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the European Common
Market, and multinational corporations and banks, largely of
us origin. The need to encourage relatively free movement of
goods and capital was felt to be essential for global
prosperity· after having witnessed the intensive economic-
6oEconomic Report of the. President (Washington, D. C., 1989)
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nationalism during the 1930 I s that contributed to global
economic depression:
Exports were forced, imports were curtailed. All
the weapons of commercial warfare were brought into
play; currencies were depreciated, exports were
subsidized, tariffs raised, exchanges controlled,
quotas imposed, and discrimination practiced through
preferential sy£tems and barter deals. Each
nation sought to sell much and buy little. 61
The GATT, implemented in 1947, codified the rules for
trade among member states against which national trade
policies of its members could be evaluated. Today US tariffs·
are their lowest in. history, averaging under 4% for all
imports, but in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the US
practiced even more protection than Great Britain. From the
end of the Civil"War to 1900, as mentioned previously, the
share of British exports to the US droPEed from 21% to about
10%, in large part because during this period us tariff rates
averaged more than 40% on all imports. The Underwood Tariff
of 1913 reduced tariffs to a·n average of under 13% of all
imports,_but after WWI the US resumed a posture of political
and economic isolationism akin to that described in the above
excerpt from Blake and Walters.· The Fordney-McCumber Tariff
of 1922 brought the average tariff rate on dutiable imports
back to nearly 45% by 1930. After the 1929 stock market crash
the Smoot-Hawley tariff was passed in 1930, establishing the
61David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics of Global
Economic Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987) 12.
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highest tariff rates in us history, averaging nearly 60%.62
A sharp decline in imports ensued, of nearly 50% from 1930 to
1934, but because of the depression, the goal of protecting
American jobs was thwarted; trading partners' retaliatory
tariffs helped decrease US exports. ·Like Great Britain
before, the US learned that protection could lead to
undesirable results for the domestic economy.
After WWII the US emerged as the world's dominant
military, political, and economic power at a point when other
nations were highly dependent on US support. US corporations
invested heavily in foreign nations with both capital
investments into productive facilities and technology,
allowing Japan, Europe and other developing nations to
industrialize. Even before the 20th century, Great Britain
and the US financed copper mines in Chile and Mexico, fruit
plantations in Central America, tea and rubber plantations in
India and Indochina, and gold mines in South Africa and
Australia. After WWI overseas manufacturing corporations were
largely American until the 1960's, when Europe and Japan began
to build their economic strength internationally.
Previous mention was made regarding the concern on the
part of Canadians and Europeans about excessive US investment.
In 1973 the :00 Department of Economic and Social Affairs
concluded the following:
If earnings generated by past inve.stment which go to
~Economic Report of the President, 1989, 151.
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foreign affiliates 'are deducted from the inflow from
direct investment, the ,net flow is generally
negative for host countries. 63
In the postwar years the US was in a unique position to
,benefit from this situation, but as other nations grew less
dependent on the US, non-American productivity began catching
up, destroying the comparative advantage of American firms.
As long as the US had no economic peer, and the Cold War
threat of a militarized Soviet union bound the Western nations
under the US defensive umbrella, economic relations were not
a predominant source of political tension. Changes,began to
take place, however, in the 1970' s. For instance, in 1971 the
US ran a trade deficit for the first time in the 20th century;
since then the US has experienced a surplus only twice. The
postwar monetary system based upon the US· dollar was
dismantled by the Nixon Administration and the dollar weakened
against foreign exchange. Protracted unemploYment and
inflation ("stagflation") in the 1970's also contributed to
the image of a declining united States. Abroad, foreign firms
who had benefitted from US technology and investment were now
competing against American goods in their own domestic markets
as well as in previously US markets. This is all quite
similar to the pattern that appeared during the decline of
\, . .
British hegemony, when the US reversed its tendency to import
by becoming a competitive rival. And like 'British economic
63Thomas J. Biersteker, Distortion or Development? (Cambridge,
. MA, 1978) 3.
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--interests at the turn of the century, America' ~ declining
industries are panicking. ' Demands for a "level playing
T field", protectionism, and claims of "national interest" are
sounded as the US' industrial strength declines relative to
other powers.
Miyohei Shinohara, in Industrial Growth, Trade, and
Dynamic Patterns in the Japanese Economy, describes this
pattern in terms of the Akamatsu-Vernon model o~ the
deveiopment of economic power and the "boomerang effect",
implying that there is a dynamic in international economics
that explains why certain nations rise to economic hegemony
and then decline .
." Kanamu Akamatsu opserves the process of economic
development as having three phases:rimportation of products
and industries from advanced countries; growth of domestic
production due to increased. domestic demand and the spread of
technology; the exportation of previously imported products
and industries due to reduced costs and economies of scale.
RaYmond Vernon adds a sUbsequent phase, in which technology is
exported abroad to seek further economic advantages, such as
lower labor or resource costs. Applying this model to both
--the US and Japan is feasible; the US imported products and
industries p~imarily from the UK until domestic production
replaced many of these imports; likewise, Japan was highly
dependent on US goods and industry until it reached a point at
which these same goods could be produced either domestically
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or in third countries such as in Southeast' Asians Newly
Indu~trializing countries (NIC's).
Another pattern of international economics, labeled "the
boomerang effect", describes the impact of postwar technology'
transfer from the developed to the less developed nations.
Put simply, the industrialized nation transfers the industry
to another location that is perhaps more cost-effective.
Textile manUfacturing, a labor-intensive industry, had been
exported to Japan by US firms seeking lower production costs.
The US then began to import what it used to produce, reSUlting
in considerable damage to the domestic textile industry. In
a similar manner, Japan faces competition from the Southeast
Asian NIC' s, to which most of its textile industry was
exported. If one is a proponent of liberal trade, this type
of shift is expected and desirable; lower-rung ind~stries are
shifted to their most productive locations so that resources
may be devoted to comparatively advantageous pursuits. These
approaches to international economics imply that
structuralized relationships are fleeting; as global economic
relations become more and more linked through computerized
networks and multinational corporations, the diffusion of
technology has become even more pervasive. Rather than a
bipolar e~change of leadership positions such as we've seen
with the Dutch, the British and the US, access to technology
and investment is more globalized and the ability of anyone
power to dominate the global economy by its comparative
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advantage seems unlikely.
By looking at global capitalism as a dynamic system in
which economic powers naturally rise and fall relative to
other nations, the "threat" of the Japanese seems less acute.
Japan's growth relative to the US's decline might suggest that
Japan would acquire the hegemonic position from the US; many
of the features of its own economic development parallel those
of the UK and the US, such as the protection of infant.
industries, heavy international infiltration, and limited
access to domestic markets. Several .factors suggest, however,
that a "Pax Nipponica" is not a likely prospect. Economic
hegemony has traditionally coincided with political and
military hegemony, particularly in the case of the US, the yen
has not become a key currency in the international system as
did the pound sterling and the dollar, and Japan's potential
for economic domination is limited by the economic competition
of the So~theast Asian NIC's the European Community, and by
other developing nations who have benefitted from g~obalized
investment and technology.,
Paul Kennedy stresses that no country has been able to
stay permanently ahead:
So far as· the international system is concerned,
wealth and power, or economic and military strength,
are always relative and should be seen as such.
Since they are relative, and since all societies are
sUbject to the inexorable tendenc,::y to change, then
the international bal~mc'es'carineverbe stfll, and
it is a folly of statesmanship to assume that they
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ever would be. 64
At the same time these words are both reassuring and
unsettling: reassuring because they help to explain the
relative decline of the US as natural; unsettling because they
anticipate the end-of American hegemony. The US can still
"\
exhibit its military prowess as in the Gulf War, but in other
respects, the US must face its own decline and others'
ascendancy for reasons that have much less to do with Japan,
per se,· than our leaders and media suggest.
64Kennedy, 1987, 536.
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7. Conclusions: The Need for Propaganda
War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal
affair.~ .. The war is waged by each ruling group
against its own sUbjects, and the object of the war
is not to make or prevent conquest& of territory,
but to keep the structure of society intact.
--George Orwell, 1984
The previous section suggested that the perception of a
uniquely Japanese economic threat belies more than an
obj ective analysis of trends in the international economy.
Moreover, in the rather short history of capitalism and free
trade that the world has seen, 'success' has implied protected
markets, inordinate power to opem markets and to impose a
division of labor that favors the more powerful, and
eventually, decline. Japan has entered this game in a major
way, and exhibits behaviors that are similar to other
capitalist powers. Japanese industries have developed behind
protective barriers; Japanese investors have expanded across
the globe in search of profitable niches for their surplus
capital; the Japanese government has played a strong role in
ensuring the profitability of corporations. In their
implementation of global capitalism, the Japanese seem to
differ in degree more than in kind.
There is, however, one inescapable difference between
Japanese capital~sts and 'traditional' capitalist powers --
'the Japanese are of color. We have littYe history with Japan
that has not been shaped by condescension and distrust. Our
history with other economic powers -- Britain, Germany, the
Netherlands -- has deeper, more affectronate roots. Americans
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have displayed hos'\:;ility towartls European groups during
certain periods of history -- war, or competition for jobs due
to immigration; but the hostility seemed to always be
transcended. Recall that in World War II, Germans and
- Italians were not apprehended solely due to their national
..
heritage. That would' have been an impossible task; they
blended in too well with the general population, not only
physically, but socially. Americ;::ans knew enough 'good'
Germans and Italians to make such a prospect unthinkable.
Japanese Americans
'----------inconspicuousness.
did not have the luxury of
Fifty years later, they still do not. As this paper has
illustrated, the treatment of Japan by the media and by
various leaders still group the Japanese into a'single entity
to be scrutinized, distrusted, and/or feared. In recent years
the--economic practices of the Japanese have ost€nsibly been at
the core of this anxiety, but a comparison between Japanese
economic activity in the United states and elsewhere, and the
media's reaction to this activity , reveals that there is
something else, beyond economics narrowly construed, that·
shapes pUblic opinion.
A propaganda analysis reveals that much of the media's
treatment adheres to generic patterns of propaganda.
Recalling Ellul's definition; that "organized groups" seek
political action, or inaction, in order to achieve, their
private goals, it is important to understand why propaganda is
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necessary, and to whom. Depending on the particular message,
the propaganda serves different ends for different interests:
it explains the US' relative economic decline; it provides a
scapegoat to which blame for the decline can be directed; it
gives us an official enemy, which not only justifies a
continual 'defensive' posture, but it also justifies US
involvement in the Pacific; and it gives us a target on which
to vent racist impulses, patriotically. On this last point,
~llul tells us:
Propaganda offers [man] an object of hatred, for all
propaganda is aimed at an enemy. And the hatred it
offers is not shameful, evil hatred that he must
hide, but a legitimate hatred, which he can justly
feel. Moreover, propaganda points out enemies that
must be slain, transforming crime into a
praiseworthy act. l
The racism is sometimes disguised by humor, such as in
cartoons that sYmbolize the Japanese as a sumo wrestler. The
sumo wrestler, a vestige of Japan's imperial traditions, is
usually grotesque in h~f:) obesity, and he is usually shown
crushing a fragile-looking Uncle Sam. London's Economist and
an advertisement from Northwest Airlines have used
illustrations of Godzilla-esque sea creatures to illustrate
the Japanese threat, and in a 1989 Los Angeles Times interview
Edith Cresson, who became France's first woman prime minister,
(
described the Japanese as "ants ... eating away at you."
The racism has also been manifested quite directly,
particularly earlier this year. After the "American workers
lEllul, 1965, 152.
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I.
are dumb and lazy" phenomenon ignited the nation shortly after
the President's trip to Asia, angry Americans took sledge-
hammers to Honda's (which were probably made in us plants),
urged on by domestic car dealers. In California a Thai
American man was beaten in March by a man who suspected him of
being Japanese; a Chinese woman at Wellesley College found the
slogan "All Japs Must Die" smeared across her dormitory room
door.
The racism assumes that the Japanese are less worthy than
Americans. Their growing economic power is thus suspect; they
can not possibly do anything better than Americans unless, of-
~ course, they cheat. This message, while it certainly
perpetuates the myth of Japanese inferiority, also helps to
justify the myth of American greatness.
Beyond simply providing a scapegoat with which to explain
us economic decline, propaganda provides us with a new post-
cold war threat.
Economic Review:
Susumu Awanohara writes in-~ Far Eastern
Some relate current US views of Japan to America's
-need for threats and Japan's growing stature as a
worthy threat .... Some Japanese observers feel that
US elites are angry at Japan not just because it is
different (a lone freak is not a great threat) but
because it has appeal as an'alternative model for
developing countries, which should be adopting the
American model. 2 '
Polls that show an .inverse relationship betw:een the
Soviet military threat and the Japanese economic threat
25 December 1991, 47.
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suggest that this "need for threats" has indeed been
fulfilled. Harvard's Robert Reich suggests that Japan is not
only an easy scapegoat whom can be blamed for economic
problems, not unlike how the "American Invaders" were blamed
for Europe's economic problems in the:1950'Si Reich observes
. , .
in much of the Japan-bashing a "call to arms" to meet the
Japanese challenge, giving us definition in the wake of the
Cold War. 3 Accordingly, revisionist James Fallows, in his
1989 More Like Us, urged "us" to "revive the idea that America
is one coherent society, with bonds that are stronger than its
internal differences. We understood this instinctively during
World War II, but not often enough since then."
The post-Cold War threat is particularly important to
those who fear decreased defense expenditures. Just as the
WWII threat of Japan was t~ansferred to the soviet Union,
China, and other bastions of communism, justifying a strong
military, so has it returned to Japan in many ways. In 1991
a CIA treatise produced at Rochester Institute of Technology,
titled Japan 2000, warned that "Japan's unceasing drive for
world domination is a matter of the highest national security.
. \~ II."
Japan is already preparing an economic sneak attack, from
which the U. S. may not recover. ,,4 In the conclusion of the
3"Is Japan:g~~};*-y Out tC;t Get U~?" ~ew York Times Book Review
9 February, 1992, 25.
/
4Cited in Bruce cummings, "C.I.A's Japan 2000 Caper," The
Nation 30 September 1991, 366. .After generating tremendous.
criticism, domestically and in Japan, R.I.T. has decided not to
publish the report.
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treatise, the authors write, "'In 1776, a brave American
patriot took it upon himself to warn the sleeping colonists
that an invasion of our shores had begun ..•. Two hundred years
later, another type of attack had begun, launched by a
different adversary .•. Japan 2000 should provide notice that
'--;->
'the rising sun' is coming -- the attach [sJ.c] has begun."
President Bush used the Pearl Harbor anniversary to
further his dual aims'of a strong military posture and non-
isolationism. He told the aUdience, liThe seeds of Pearl
Harbor were sown back in 1919 when a victorious America
decided that in the absence of a threatening enemy abroad, we
should turn all our energies inward. That notion of
isolationism flew escort for the very bomber that attacked our
men fifty years ago. II And on CBS's "Remember Pearl Harbor" he
avowed to co-hosts Norman Schwarzkopf and Charles Kuralt,
"This country will not be surprised again .... You learn not to
suck yourself back into some splendid isolation and turn your
back on the rest of the world, and of course when we were
attacked in Pearl Harbor we were in it right up to our
eyeballs. . Maybe if we had been more vigilant and less
protectionist and more engaged with the rest of the world all
that could have been averted through diplomacy."
This is the official foreign policy stance of the Bush
Admini-stration -- global engagement. L~st year; Under
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick told Malaysians, "To those
who doubted America's commitment and staying power, the Gulf
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Crisis demonstrated that American global engagement is here to
stay .... The united states its military presence, its
commitment, its reassurance -- has been the balancing wheel of
an informal, yet highly effective security structure for more
than four decades." Later that year, only weeks before the
President's Asian trip, Secretary of State Baker told The
Manchester Guardian Weekly, "Our pre-eminent position in
international affairs is important in terms of US interests,
US economic interests. That if we pull back we will be less
competitive from an economic standpoint, internationally, and
that our history shows us that periods of isolationism are not
productive in terms of the domestic US economy."s
When Japan is an enemy, or not complet~ly trustworthy,
even inept, Us intervention seems justified. When the
Japanese practice unfair trade, hurting our economy,
threatening the American Way of Life, protectionism and tough
trade tactics are necessary. When the US appears to'be in
decline, the dual myths of Japanese inferiority and American
superiority assure that the problem is an external one. The
propaganda, helps to further these goals by providing a
complete framework for understanding the world around us -- no
ambiguities, no qu~stions.
-
But what is democracy if it is
not constant questioning, confronting ambiguities, exploring
alternatives, and understanding and respecting others?
America, the nation, is not the unrivaled hegemon it was
S15 December 1991, 18.
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in the postwar years. An open mind might surmise that-this
change coul=d be good for us; being "Number One" places a lot
of burdens upon a nation -- military, political, economic. I
think of the words of a progressive Japanese writer, pondering
the future of Japan had only Emperor Showa assured the
Japanese in the months"before Pearl Harbor, "We don't need a
Greater Japan, a small Japan will do.,,6' Fifty years later,
this possibility is;as unlikely in Japan as it is in the US,
and it is this option, of a "small America", that seems to be
the option that propaganda buries most of all.
6Nobumasa Tanaka, quoted in Norma Field, "Beyond Pearl Harbor,"
The Nation 23 December 1991, 21.
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Chart One
Th"eats to U.S. Vital Interests
The grnph illustrates the percentage who viewed e:1ch item as a "critical threat" I"3ther than an "important hut not critical thre:u" or u not an important
thrc:ll" til the vit.1 interest of the United Smes,
"",
Economic power uf J:lpan
[)c\'c1opmcm of Chin:a as a world po~'c:r
~lilil:lry' power uf Soviet Union
Econnmic cnmpc=tilion from Eumpc:
Source: Rielly, p. 87.
Chart T\oIO
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Thennometer Ratings for Countries
-The Public
~tt::ln Temper:uure (degreesI
Source: R~elly, p. 95~
\990 19H6 1982
Gnad:J. 76 77 74Grt"Jt Britain 74 1] 68Genn:mv· 62 62 59SoViet Cnion 59 l2 261t,lv
Pol;nd 59 58 5i;7 54 52Mexico 56 59 60Fr:J.nce 56 58 60Brazil 54 54 54
'Isr.lc! 54 59 55Saudi Ar3biJ 53 50 52Philippines 53 59Egypt 52 49 52J'p,n 52 61 5lSouth Africa 51 48 45Taiw::zn 48 52 49India 48 48 48
.50mh KorC3 47 51 44Nigeria 47 46 44People's Republic of Chin, 45 53 47NiC3r.l~~a 44 46Iran 27 2J 28Iraq 20Snia 54 42J~nhn
Lcb:tnon 47
Cub, 46( i7
Note: D3~h mt::lns not Jsked.
*In sUZ:'cys prior to 1990 this was asked 3S WCSt Gc~ny.
j
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Chart Three
Trade Relations with Japan and the EC
"In gene",l, do you think thot Jap3n1the countries
of the European Community (ECl pr.letice fair
trade or unfair trade with the United States,"
EC JAPAN
Source: Rielly, p. 95.
Chart Four
Source: -Rielly, p. 95.
Foreign-Policy Goals Considered "Very
Important"
Public le:iders
Protecting the jobs of American workers 65% 39%
Protecting the interests of business 63 27
.broad
Securing adequate: supplies of energy 6\ 60
Defending our allies' securiry 61 56
Preventing the spre:ld of nucle:.tr wopons 59 94
Promoting 2nd defending human rights in ·58 45
other counmes
Imprmring the global cnvironmcm 5B 72
Protecting wokcr nations 3g3inst foreign 57 28
aggression
Reducing our tr:1dc deficit with foreign 56 62
countries
Matching Soviet miliury power 56 20
Containing communism 56 10
\Vorldwide arms control 53 80
Strengthening the United Nations 44 39
Helping to improve the sundard of living 4\ 42
of less developed narions
Helping [0 bring 2. democr.uic fonn of 28 26
government to other n:arions
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Chart Five
Foreign Direct Investment Positioniin the United States
Billions of dollars
280
Chart Six
240
20Q
180'
120
80
40
c::J United Kingdom
~ Netherlands
I!IIIIIIIID Other Europe
m.c.ciiil Japan
~Canada
c:::::Il:I Other
1962 1983 1984 1985 1986 1967
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1989,
p. 135.-
Chart Seven
Source: Fortune, Fall 1990
(Pacific Rim Issue),
p. 100.
Capital flows Into
US by countryI Jan.-Jun.
iJss million 1988 1989 1990
All cauntnes I~8,4J:i In,244 ,10,544
Bril.ln 1.18,774 20,235 1,270
Jap.n 117,838 17,269 4,981
Netherl.nds I 4,766 9,826 2,053 ,
W. Germ.ny I 2,306 4,229 -765
/101" PosilM lUllber...,esetiS caQilaJ ~Row;
n~ive runDe! capital outflow
Total foreign direct
Investment In the US
Jan.-June
USSmill/an 1989 1990
Foreign direct 38,403 10,54-1
Investment
New equity 17,688 16,790
Investments
Reinvested earnings -614 -2,921
Intercompany accounts 21,330 '3,324 1
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 November 1990, p. 69.
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Chart Eight
INTERNATIONAL'MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 1988
Count r'{ /RegioI1
North America
United Kingdom
Other EC
Japan
All Other Countries
Number of
Inward:
1246
226
527
327
Transactions
Outward:
550
884
422
81
389
$ Billion
Inward:
75.5
17.7
13.7
11.5
Invested
Outward:
20.1
44.5
19.4
11.0
23.4
Horld Total 2326 2326 118.4 118.4
Source: World Economic Monitor
Chart Nine
WORLDWIDE STOCK OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Year-end 1987)
Country % of World Total
33.3
18.1
9
8.5
8.5
5.2
Countries 17.4
United States
United Kingdom
West Germany
Japan
Netherlands
Canada
All Other
$913 billion=100.00%
Source: Horld Economic Monitor
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u.s. S millions
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IChart Eleven
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Chart Thirteen
U.S. Merchandise Exports and
Imports by Area, 1981-1990
Source:E~onomic.Ree°r:.t
of the President, 1991.
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Chart Fourt'een
PERCENT GDP GAINED FROM EXPORTS (Year-end 1990)
Germany 27.6
Canada 23.4
France 18.5
Japan 9.7
United States 7.2
Sourcei. Economic Report of the President. 1992, International Monetary Fund.
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u. s. $ millions
Flows
Cl
19B1 19B2 19B3 19B4 19B5 1986 19B7 1988
::r
'"'1
rt
Europe 3013 150 90 107 117 334 235 448 817 "l
France 202 19 16 7 7 21 16 20 27
...
HI
Germany 546 37 18 16 20 23 47 53 195
rt
(1l
Netherlands 482 15 7 31 26 47 19 7B 157
(1l
. ::>
switzerland 92B N.A. 1.4 10 10 6B B9 169 273
United Kingdom 51B 30 77 24 46 58 35 49 112
Other OECD countries
Canada 152 2 N.A. 31 N.A. 13 2 4 22
united states 62B8 149 449 772 214 385 4BB 938 1774
Ilona Kona 390 6.8 25.4 67 42.3 39 57 36 44
.j>
0'
NOTE: These figures are collected on an approval or notification basis and are not
strictly comparable to balance-of-payments data. Moreover, there is a divergence
between the methods used to measure inward and outward direct investment.
Reinvestment to acquire equity is generally included.
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Chart Sixteen
JAPAHESE lNPORTS, 1985-1990 (in $ millions)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
From the United States:
26,099 29,410 31,957 42,267 48,253 52,842
From the Industrialized Countries:
51,680 60,591 69,888 92,742 104,780 118, 110",
UNITED STATES IM~ORTS
From Japan:
72,380 85,457 88,074 93,128
From Canada:
69,427 68,662 71,510 81,430
From the Industrialized Countries:
228,755 250,930 262,150 282,716
97,110
89,550
295,954
93,070
93,780",,",
304,103'"
* Between 1985 and 1998, 46% of Japan's imports from industrialized countries have come from
the US; roughly 33% of US imports from industrialized countries come from Japan.
** Note the growth in US imports from Canada vis a vis a decline in imports from Japan.
PER CAPITA IMPORTS
Japan i~ports fram the US:
US imports from Japan:
1988
$341
$372
1989
$389
$388
1990
$426
$372
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, 1991 Yearbook (Wash.,~D.:.: International Monetary
Fund), p. 240.
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Chart Seventeen
JAPAN'S TRADE SURPLUS (1985-1990 ) (expressed in $ billions)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
With
World: 47 83 80 78 64 53
With US: 41 53 53 48 46 38
US TRADE DEFICIT (1985-i 990)j.
With
World:
-133 -155 -170 -138 -129 -123
With
Japan: -50 -58 -60 -55 -52 -44
Source: Direction of Trade StatiStics, 1991 Yearbook (Wash. , D.C. : International Monetary
Fund) , p. 240.
Chart Eighteen
JAPANESE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1985-1990 (measured in $ millions)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
66,684 ' 81,926 85,011 90,245 93,954 91,121
% Growth in Exports:
23/0 3.8% 6/0 4% 3°'- 10
US EXPORTS TO JAPAN
22,631 26,882 28,249
\.
37,620 44,584 48,585
% Growth in Exports:
4% 31.9/0 16.51'0 12.31'0 61'o
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, 1991 Yearbook (Wash., D.C.: International Monetary
Fund), p. 240.
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Cumulative
Flows Flows
End of
Fiscal Year
03/31/89 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 i988
Europe, total 30164 511 650 761 883 1937 1930 3469 6576 9116
Belgium 1027 67 107 64 126 71 84 50 70 164
France 1764 83 54 102 93 117 67 152 330 463
Germany 2364 110 116 194 117 245 172 ·210 403 409
Italy 370 8 28 19 13 22 23 59 109 N.A.
Luxembourg 4729 10 104 127 265 315 300 1092 1764 657
Netherlands 5525 41 138 73 113 452 613 651 829 2359
Spain 1045 22 39 19 52 140 91 86 283 161
Switzerland 1432 28 67 79 37 229 60 91 224 454
United Kingdom 10554 186 110 176 153 318 375 984 2473 3956
Other OECD countries
Canada 3231 112 167 167 136 184 100 276 653 626
United States 71860 1484 2329 2738 2565 3360 5395 10165 14704 21701
Latin America
Inc. offshore bankiJ1g~ 31617 588 1181 1503 1878 2290 2616 4737 4816 6428
Middle East
Inc. OPEC 3388 158 96 124 175 4273 45 44 62 259
Asia 32227 1186 3338 1384 1847 1628 1435 2327 4868 5569
Africa 4604 139 573 489 364 326 172 309 272 653
NOTE: These figures are collected on an approval or notification basis and are not strictly comparable to
balance-of-payments data. Moreover, there is a divergence between the methods used to measure, inward
and out~ard direct inv~tment. Reinvestment to acquire equity is generally included.
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Chart Twenty Commodore Perry's Instructions for Japan, 1852
Acting SecretarJ of State C.M. Conrad
to Secretary of the Navy John P.
Kennedy, 5 November 1852.
AS THE squadron destined for Japan will shortly be prepared to sail, I
am directed by the President to explain the objccts of the expedition, and
to give some gcncral directions as to the mode by which those objects
are to be accomplished.
Since the hlands of Japan were first visited by European nations, efforts
h""e cons~anily been made by the various maritime powers to establish
commercial intercourse with a country whose large population and re·
puted wealth hold out great temptations te mercantile enterprise. Portugal
was the first to make the attempt, and her example was followed by Hoi·
lalld, England, Spain, and Russia; and finally by the Uuited States. All
these attempts, however, have thlls far been unsuccessful; the permission
enjoyed for a short period by the Portuguese to trade with the islands,
and that granted to Holland to semi annually a single vessel to the port of
Nagasaki, hardly deserving to be considered exceptions to this rema,k.
China is the only country which eanies on any considerable trade with
these islands.
So rigorously is this system of exclusion carried out, that foreign yessels
arc not permitted to enler their ports in distress, or even to do an act of
kindness to their own people•.•.
When vessels arc wrecked or driven ashore on the islands their crews
arc subjected to the most cruel treatment. Two instances of this have re·
eently occurred.••.
Every nation has undoubtedly the right to dcterminc for itself the ex·
tent to which it will hold intercourse with othcr naliolls; The same law of
nations, however, \vhich protects a nation ill the exercise of this right im·
poses UpOIl hcr certain dulies which she cannot jllstly disregard. Among
these duties none is morc imperative than that which requires her to suet'or
and relieve those persons who are cast by the perils of the oceall IIpon her
shores. This dllty is, it is trlle, amollg those lhat are denomiuatcd by writ·
ers on public law impcrfect, and wbich cOllfer 110 right on other nations
to esact their perfcmnanee; 1levertheless, if a nation nnt 01lly habih.ally
amI systematkally disregards it, but treats such unfmtunate persons as if
they werc the most i\trncio1l5 criminals, stich Ilatiolls m;,lY jllstly be l'on-
sid~red as the most common cllemy of mankiml. .
That the'civilizedllalilllls of the world should for ages h'\\'e suhmittl'll
to such trealnll'ut by a weak ami semi·barh"ruus pCllple, cau {lilly he ae·
t:ounll'u for on the supposition that, from 1I1(~ remutenl'SS of the country.
instanecs of such tre'atmellt were of rare occurrence, ami the difficlIlty uf
eh.lstising it very great. it call hardly be doubled that if Japall were situ·
ated as near the continent of Europo or of Ameri,a as it is to that of Asia,
its government would long since have been either treatcd as barbarians,
or been compellcd to respect those usages of civilized states of which it
re:.eives the protection.• , •
Source: Long, ed., p. 96.
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lIecent events - the navigation of the ocean by steam, the acquisition
and rapid settlement by this country of a vast territory on the Pacific. the
discovery of gold in that region, the rapid communication established
across the isthmus which separates the two oceans - bave practically
brought the countries of the cast in closer proximity to our own: although
the consequences of these events ha,'e scarcely begun to be felt, the inter·
course between them has already greatly increased, and no limits can be
'lssigncd to its future extension....
The object sought by this gO"enunent are,-
1. To effect some permanent arrangl'ment for the protection of ArneI"
ican seamen ::nd property wrecked on these islands, or driven into their
ports by stress of weather.
2, The permission to American vessels to entcr one or more of their ports
in order to obtaiu supplies of provisions, water, fuel, &c" or, in case of
disast' "" to rcfit so as to enable them to prosecute their voyage.
It is very desirable to ham permission to establish a depot for coal, if
not on ,1ne of the principal islands, at least on some small uninhabited one, '
of which, it is said, there are several in their vicinity.
3. The permission to our vessels to enter one or morc of their ports for
the purpose of disposing of their cargoes by sale or barter.••.
The next question is, how arc the above mentioned objects to be at·
taincd?
It is manifest, from past ('xperiencc, that. arguments 01" persnasion ad..
dressed to this people, unless they be seconded by some imposing mallifes-
tation of power will be utterly unavailing.
Yuu will, thel'ci'bre, be pleased tu direct the commander of the squadron
to proceed, with his whole force, to such poillt on the coast of Japan as
he may deem most advisable, and there endeavor to open a communica-
tion with the go"ernment, alld, if possible, to sec the cmperor in person,
all,l cldh'cr to him the letter of introduction from the President with
wideh he is charged. lIe will state tl"lt he has been sent across the ocean
],y the Presidcnt to deliver that letter to the emperor, and to communicate
with his p;o\'crnmcnt on matters of importance to the l\\!o cmmtril's. That
the President entertaius the most frieudly feeling towanls Japan, bllt has
Ill'ell sllrprised and gricved to Icarn, that whl'n any of the pl·ople of the
Ullited States go, of their 0\\11 accord, or arc thrown by the perils of the
sca within the domillious of the l'mpcror, they are treated as if they were
Ids worst l'lIl'mics. . .. -
If, afkr hadng exhausted every arglnnent and ,'wry me.lIIs of persua-
sion, the cOllllnodore should fail to obtain from the government ,my re-
laxation of thdr system of CXclll~ioli. or C\,('11 any aSsurance uf hllll1ane
treatment of our ,hili.wrecked ,eamen, he will then change his tOlll', alii!
inform them in the most unequivocal terms that it is the determination of
this gnvernmcnt to iusist, that hereafter all citizeus or vessels of the United
States that may be \\Tceked on their enasts, or dri\'eu by stress of weather
into thcir harbors shall, so Inng"'s they arc compelled to remain ther.., be
treated with humanity; alld that if any acts of cruelty shonld hereafter be
practised npon citizcnsof this country, whether by tlle government or by
the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severely chastised. In case he should
snceced in obtaining cOllcossions on any of the points above mentioned, it
is desirable that they should be reduced into the fqrm of a treaty. for
negotiating which he will be furnished with tlle requisite powers••••
'>
Chart Twenty-one
JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO. AND EMIGRATION FROM.
THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES: 1891·1942'
Fiscal Immigration Emigration Fiscal Immigration Fiscal Immigratior. Emigration
Year (Aliens fAliens Year (Aliens Year (Aliens IAliens
Ending Admined) Deported) Ending Admined) Ending Admitted) Deported)
1891 1,136 No 1908 9,544 1925 3,222 7,265
1892 1,498 Data 1909 2,432 1926 4,652 7,751
1893 1,380 from 1910 2,59& 1927 5,477 8,192
1894 1,931 1891 1911 4,282 1928 5,935 8,016
1895 1,150 to 1912 5,358 1929 6,293 7,281
\
1896 i,l10 1907 1913 6,771 1930 6,274 7,490
1897 1,526 1914 8,462 1931 5,810 7,124
1898 2,230 1915 9,029 1932 4,137 6,138
1S99 3,395 1916 9,100 1933 3,065 6,225
1900 12,628 1917 9,159 1934 2,927 5,368
1901 . 4,911 1918 11,143 193." 3,483 5,333
1902 5,330 1919 11,404 1936 3,719 4,855
1903 6,996 1920 12,868 1937 4,254 5,140
1904 7,792 1921 10,675 1938 3,908 4,610
1905 4,329 19i2 8,981 1939 3,200 4,265
1906 5,192 1923 8,055 1940 2,942 4,206
1907 9,959 1924 11,526 1941 2,642 4,974
1942 480 1,600
Source: Kitano, p. 176.
Chart Twenty-two
NUMBER OF JAPANESE FARMS! IN CALIFORNIA BY DECADE, 1900-1940'
Years
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
No. of Japanese Farmers
Acreage
39 ~ 1,816
4,698 194,809
5,152
361,276
3,956
191,427
5,135
220,094
• Adapted from Masakazu, Iwata, "Jap:lOese Immigrants in California Agriculture,"Agri·
culrural history. XXXVI, 1(1962),25·37.
tlncludes ~wned, leased, shared and contract farms.
Total U.S., 37 in California
Source: Kitano, p. 155.
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Chart Twenty-three
INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (Year-end 1989)
World: 23.4
Japan: 31.5
Canada: 23.4
Germany: 21.3
?'rance. 21.3
Uni~eci Kingdom 19.6
United States: 17
CONSUNPTlON AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (Year-end 1989)
World: 73.8
United States 84.5",
Canada 79.8
France 78.3
Germany 72.1
Japan 66.4
United :<ingdom· 64.1
* Only Greece consumes a higher percentage of its GDP.
Source: International Financial Statistics, 1991 Yearbook (Hashington, D.C.: IntC'rnational
~lonetary Fund), p. 169.
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Chart Twenty-five
Exports as Percentage of World Total
100
SO
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1S!!.5 1965. . 1975 1984
~ource: Blake and Walters, p. 15.
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